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I. INTRODUCTION 
Welcome to the 2008 edition of the NASA Range Safety Annual Report. Funded by NASA 
Headquarters, this report provides a NASA Range Safety overview for current and potential 
range users. This year, along with full length articles concerning various subject areas, we have 
provided updates to standard subjects with links back to the 2007 original article. Additionally, 
we present summaries from the various NASA Range Safety Program activities that took place 
throughout the year, as well as information on several special projects that may have a profound 
impact on the way we will do business in the future. 
The sections include a program overview and 2008 highlights of Range Safety Training; Range 
Safety Policy; Independent Assessments and Common Risk Analysis Tools Development; 
Support to Program Operations at all ranges conducting NASA launch operations; a continuing 
overview of emerging Range Safety-related technologies; Special Interests Items that include 
recent changes in the ELV Payload Safety Program and the VAS explosive siting study; and 
status reports from all of the NASA Centers that have Range Safety responsibilities. 
As is the case each year, contributors to this report are too numerous to mention, but we thank 
individuals from the NASA Centers, the Department of Defense, and civilian organizations for 
their contributions. We have made a great effort to include the most current information 
available. We recommend that this report be used only for guidance and that the validity and 
accuracy of all articles be verified for updates. 
This is the third year we have utilized this web-based format for the annual report. We 
continually receive positive feedback on the web-based edition, and we hope you enjoy this 
year's product as well. 
It has been a very busy and productive year on many fronts as you will note as you review this 
report. Thank you to everyone who contributed to make this year a successful one, and I look 
forward to working with all of you in the years to come . 
. 
Rich Lamoreaux 
NASA Range Safety Manager 
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II. AGENCY RANGE SAFETY PROGRAM OVERVIEW AND 2008 
HIGHLIGHTS 
2008 was one of our busiest and most exciting years in Range Safety. Before we highlight the 
areas covered in this year's edition, it is important to restate the goal of the NASA Range Safety 
Program. The program is defined in NPR 8715.5, dated 8 July, 2005, and is signed by the 
NASA Administrator. The goal of the program is to protect the public, the workforce, and 
property during range operations such as launching, flying, landing, and testing launch/flight 
vehicles. This goal applies to all centers and test facilities and all NASA vehicle programs 
including expendable launch vehicles, reusable launch vehicles, uninhabited aerial systems, the 
Space Shuttle, and the Constellation Program. Also included in this group are NASA-funded 
commercial ventures that involve range operations. We meet the goal of NPR 8715.5 by 
evaluating, mitigating, and controlling the hazards associated with range operations such as 
debris, overpressure, and toxics. With that in mind, we continued our effort to do a line-by-line 
review of the NPR, identifying areas in need of updating and suggested additions in an effort to 
strengthen the policy arm of NASA Range Safety. 
This is the third year we have gone with a web-based format, which continues to evolve, and 
our outline remains mostly unchanged from last year. However, we have incorporated one 
major change in our approach to updating articles: instead of repeating standard article 
information, we have decided to include updates only and provide links back to the original 
articles. We hope this will provide a more user-friendly format. Several areas of range safety 
will be covered that demonstrate how we meet or implement the Range Safety Program. A 
primary focus is training and our continuing efforts regarding the NASA Range Safety Training 
Program. 
We remain extremely busy in the development, implementation, and support of range safety 
policy. The Constellation Program is in full swing, and we have been supporting tailoring 
exercises with representatives from the Program, the 45th Space Wing, and the Launch 
Constellation Range Safety Panel for both Ares I-X and Ares I. Additionally, we supported 
several launches this year and continue to work updated agreements with our partners at the 
Eastern and Western Ranges. 
NASA Range Safety personnel continue to support the Range Commanders Council meetings 
and have been involved in updating policy related to flight safety systems and flight safety 
analysis. A recap of these efforts is highlighted. We address our continued support to the 
Common Standards Working Group in an effort to codify updates to AFSPCMAN 91-710,91-
711, and 91-712 requirements for Reusable Launch Vehicles. Uninhabited Aerial Vehicles 
(UAV) policies development for operations at the Eastern Range is discussed, as well as 
continuing efforts regarding several challenges that we faced in the fl ight safety systems realm 
this year. 
Additionally, we continue to support HQ-sponsored Infrastructure, Facilities, and Operations 
(IFO) Audits, and we provide a synopsis of inspections conducted at Wallops Flight Facility and 
Ames Research Center. The plans for the development of a common risk analysis tool for all 
NASA Range Safety efforts was an area of particular interest this year, and we discuss this 
effort in depth. We also address launch operations at KSC, the Eastern and Western Range, 
DFRC WFF, and Reagan Test Site. 
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Emerging range safety technology continues to interest many in the range safety community. 
Several articles focus on efforts in this area that have taken place over the past year. 
We once again provide insight into some special interest items, specifically regarding the effort 
to obtain a signed ELV Payload Safety NPR and VAS explosive siting for Constellation 
processing. 
As always, we will conclude with range safety reports from the NASA Centers that were actively 
involved with range safety issues throughout the year. 
A. AGENCY RANGE SAFETY TRAINING 2008 UPDATE 
To date, we have conducted 19 Range Safety Orientation Courses with a total of 490 students 
taking part in 5 Flight Safety Analysis Courses with a total of 83 students, 4 Flight Safety 
Systems Courses with a total of 65 students, and 3 Range Safety Operations Courses with a 
total of 18 students. The schedule for all courses for 2009 is depicted in Figure 1 below. 
For more background and information on Agency Range Safety Training, click here. 
FIGURE 1: 2009 COURSE SCHEDULE 
1. Range Safety Orientation Course 
The Range Safety Orientation Course, as outlined in Figure 2, is designed to provide an 
understanding of the range safety mission, associated policies and requirements, and NASA 
roles and responsibilities. It introduces the students to the major ranges and their capabilities, 
defines and discusses the major elements of range safety (flight analysis, flight termination 
systems, and range operations), and briefly addresses associated range safety topics such as 
ground safety, frequency management, and uninhabited aerial systems (UASs). The course 
emphasizes the principles of safety risk management to ensure the public and NASA/range 
workforces are not subjected to risk of injury greater than that of normal day-to-day activities. 
It is designed to inform the audience of the services offered by the Range Safety organization, 
present timeframes that allow adequate interface with range safety during Program/Project 
startup and design in an effort to minimize potential delays and costs, and recommend ways of 
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making the working relationship with Range Safety beneficial for the range user. This course 
includes a visit to Range Safety facilities at CCAFS/KSC and will normally only be presented at 
the Eastern Range. If you wish to discuss presenting the class at your location, please contact 
the NSTC staff. 
Target Audience: 
• Senior, program, and project managers 
• Safety, Reliability, Quality, and 
Maintainability Professionals with an 
interest in Range Safety activities 
2. Range Flight Safety Analysis 
Course 
The Range Flight Safety Analysis Course is 
designed to give the student a detailed 
understanding of range safety analysis. As 
depicted in Figure 3, it includes NASA, FAA, 
and 000 requirements for flight safety 
analysis; a discussion of range operation 
hazards, risk criteria, and risk management 
processes; and an in-depth coverage of the 
containment and risk management analyses 
performed for expendable launch vehicles 
(EL Vs) at the Eastern Range. Although the 
course is based on EL Vs at the Eastern 
Range, the overall analysis process and 
concepts are also applicable to other vehicles 
and other ranges. The course concentrates 
on debris hazards and analyses but also 
includes an overview of toxic, blast, and 
radiation risks and analyses. The course 
includes a class exercise that covers the 
entire analysis process. 
Prerequisite: Prior attendance at NSTC 
Course 074, Range Safety Orientation, or 
equivalent experience. 
Target Audience: 
• NASA, FAA, and 000 Range Safety 
Analysts 
• Range Safety personnel in other 
disciplines FIGURE 2: ORIENTATION COURSE OUTLINE 
• Program/project managers and engineers 
who design potentially hazardous systems 
to operate on a range 
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FIGURE 3: RANGE FLIGHT SAFETY ANALYSIS COURSE OUTLINE 
3. Range Flight Safety Systems Course 
This course describes required safety responsibilities and Flight Termination System (FTS) 
procedures and plans. It also includes FTS component design, performance, test, and 
subsystem pre-launch requirements (see Figure 4). The course then transitions to the 
applicable FTS ground support and monitoring equipment, FTS analysis, and component test 
history. The course continues with a review of Uninhabited Aerial Systems (UAS) flight 
termination systems, balloon universal termination packages, and the Enhanced Flight 
Termination System (EFTS). The class concludes with a description of the Autonomous Flight 
Safety System. The course size at KSC is limited due to tours we conduct at the Navy Trident 
trainer facility (located on CCAFS.) 
Prerequisites: 
• Completion of NSTC 074, Range Safety Orientation, or equivalent level of experience or 
training, is required 
• Completion of NSTC 002, System Safety Fundamentals, or NSTC 008, System Safety 
Workshop, is recommended 
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Target Audience: 
• NASA, FAA, and 000 Range Safety Personnel working Flight Safety Systems issues 
• Range safety personnel in other disciplines 
• Program/project managers and engineers who design potentially hazardous systems to 
operate on a range 
• Personnel who conduct hazardous operations on a range 
FIGURE 4: RANGE FLIGHT SAFETY SYSTEMS COURSE OUTLINE 
4. Range Safety Operations Course 
To ensure mission success and the safety of operations for the Range, a formal process has 
evolved within the range community to provide Range Safety operations. This course 
addresses the roles and responsibilities of the Range Safety Officer for Range Safety 
operations as well as real-time support, including pre-launch, launch, flight, re-entry, landing, 
and any associated mitigation. Mission rules , countdown activities, and display techniques are 
presented. Additionally, tracking and telemetry, along with vehicle characteristics and 
sortie/range generation and checkout, are covered in detail. Finally, post operations, lessons 
learned, and the use and importance of contingency plans are presented. Those participating in 
the course receive hands-on training and exercises to reinforce the instruction. It is important to 
note that this course is only presented at WFF (Wallops Flight Facility) and is limited to six 
participants. The course centers on the topics shown in Figure 5 below. 
Prerequisites: 
• NSTC course 074, Range Safety Orientation, or equivalent experience and/or training, and 
a background in range safety. 
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• NSTC-0086; Range Flight Safety Analysis, or equivalent experience and/or training. 
• NSTC-0096; Flight Safety Systems, or equivalent experience and/or training 
Target Audience: 
Persons identified as needing initial training for future/current job as RSO with NASA or RSO 
management. 
FIGURE 5: RANGE SAFETY OPERATIONS COURSE 
If you wish to attend any of the courses offered, please contact your Center training manager, or 
refer to the NSTC web site course catalogue located at: 
https://satern.nasa.gov/elms/learner/catalog/ 
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B. DEVELOPMENT, IMPLEMENTATION, SUPPORT OF RANGE 
SAFETY POLICY 
1. Constellation Tailoring 
NASA Range Safety continued to support the Constellation Program in its efforts for a 2009 
Ares 1-X test flight by tailoring range safety requirements with the 45th Space Wing and the 
Program. Since the Program is required to meet the combined requirements of NASA 
Procedural Requirements (NPR) 8715.5, Range Safety Program, and Air Force Space 
Command Manual (AFSPCMAN) 91-710, Range Safety User Requirements, we worked jointly 
to bring these requirements into one document, Cx 70155-01, Air Force Space Command 
Manual 91-710 / NPR 8715.5 Range Safety User Requirements Manual Tailored for the Ares I-
X Flight Test Vehicle Mission. A version of the tailored Ares 1-X Range Safety Flight Test 
Vehicle Mission document is complete with final signatures from the KSC Center Director, 
Constellation Program Manager, and 45th Space Wing Commander. The new document 
codifies the philosophy of shared responsibility for all aspects of range safety between the 45th 
Space Wing and NASA and will serve as the foundation for future tailoring efforts between the 
two organizations. 
Departures from current baseline requirements were documented via four range safety waivers. 
Although not the normal process, the team agreed after considerable discussion that this 
method was the most appropriate for documenting the noncompliances associated with the 
decision to incorporate heritage Shuttle Flight Termination System (FTS) components. 
Development of a tailored document to support the Ares 1 launch vehicle has also begun. All of 
the FTS noncompliances with the AFSPCMAN 91-710 baseline are expected to be eliminated 
for Ares I. This document will also incorporate the philosophy of shared range safety 
responsibility between the 45th Space Wing and NASA. 
Integral to both of these joint tailored documents is the Launch Constellation Range Safety 
Panel (LCRSP), which is the group responsible for range safety activities for elements of 
Constellation launch vehicle flights and preoperational test flights (e.g., Crew Launch Vehicle 
(CLV), Cargo Launch Vehicle (CaLV), and the Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV), etc.). These 
documents are briefed through the LCRSP prior to final coordination and approvals by the KSC 
Center Director, Constellation Program Manager, and 45th Space Wing Commander. 
For more background and information on Constellation Tailoring, click here. 
2. NPR 8715.5 Revision 
As NASA Range Safety continues to grow and mature, it became evident that our range safety 
requirements needed to do the same. In late 2007, we initiated an effort to revise our current 
NPR requirements document, NRP 8715.5, Range Safety Program, dated 8 July, 2005. To aid 
in this effort, an NPR Technical Interchange Meeting (TIM) was conducted in Colorado Springs, 
CO involving subject matter experts from NASA, Air Force Space Command, and the Federal 
Aviation Administration (FAA). The TIM yielded positive results with respect to commonality of 
requirements and updates to our range safety requirements. 
We have spent the majority of 2008 vetting comments and coordinating deletions, updates, and 
language within our organization and NASA Headquarters. There have been a few challenges 
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that we continue to work, such as noncompliance terminology, aggregate risk, and Uninhabited 
Aerial Systems, to mention a few. 
There is an ongoing discussion within NASA to utilize common terms and definitions associated 
with noncompliances, be it variance, deviation, waiver, or equivalent level of safety (ELS). We 
are working to ensure that these terms are consistent with other NASA procedural requirements 
documents and throughout all NASA programs. Both the Air Force and FAA use the terms 
waiver and ELS to identify noticeable or marked departures from requirements, standards, or 
procedures. Although these terms are commonly understood within the range safety 
community, they may not be consistently interpreted by other NASA programs. 
Even before a Werner Von Braun-led V-2 rocket launched from White Sands Missile Range 
landed outside of its containment area just east of Alamogordo, New Mexico on 15 May, 1947, 
there have been questions with respect to the acceptable risk criteria for workers and the 
general public. Early in the space program, risks were largely unknown, and as a precaution, 
isolated areas were selected as launch sites to accommodate a public safety containment 
philosophy. As the space program has evolved, containment has become more difficult due to 
the increasing range populations and explosive potential of launch vehicles, encroachment of 
populations and municipalities around launch sites, and increased sensitivity to public risk. To 
help deal with these concerns, a risk management philosophy was adopted to help ensure 
people are not subjected to a risk of injury that is greater than that associated with normal day-
to-day risk. 
Today, NASA's risk criteria is expressed in terms of Probability of Impact, Probability of 
Casualty (Pc) (or individual risk), and Casualty Expectation (Ec) (or collective risk). These 
criteria can be applied per mission or annually but are always applied on a per hazard basis. 
These acceptable risk criteria have been in our NPR since its posting in 2005 and have been a 
community standard for many years. In 2006, the Range Commanders Council decided to 
transition from the collective risk criteria to an aggregate risk criterion to better encompass a 
combination of all risks associated with a mission. 
Transitioning to aggregate risk will change how the range safety community and risk acceptors 
apply collective risk via the aggregate risk criteria. Individuals must not be exposed to a 
probability of casualty greater than 1 E-6 for any single mission from all hazards. Collective risk 
for the general public now must not exceed a casualty expectation of 100E-6 (1 E-4) for any 
Single mission from all hazards. According to RCC 321, Common Risk Criteria Standards for 
National Test Ranges: 
Limiting the collective risk for the general public to 100E-6 (1 E-4) expected 
casualties per mission ensures protection that is generally consistent with, or 
more conservative than, the previous limit of 30E-6 (3E-4) expected fatalities 
due to inert debris. Specifically, the typical ratio of fatality expectation to 
casualty expectation for the typical hazards indicate that the 100E-6 (1 E-4) 
expected casualties criteria is likely to limit a range activity more than the 
previous limit, unless the range activity presents inert debris hazards only. For 
example, a launch with inert and explosive debris hazards and a risk estimate 
of 100E-6 (1 E-4) expected casualties would typically correspond to about 25E-
6 expected fatalities. So the 100E-6 expected casualty limit provides more 
protection than the 30E-6 expected fatality limit, particularly if toxic or DFO risks 
are significant. Thus, the current standard for expected casualties is rational: 
consistent with the previous expected fatality criteria from a safety perspective. 
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This same ratio between the expected casualties and expected fatalities criteria 
for General Public is carried over the Mission Essential/Critical Operations 
Personnel categories and Annual criteria. 
Additionally, there has been a move afoot over the past few years to transition from the term 
"uninhabited aerial vehicle (UAV)" to "unmanned aerial system (UAS)." The rationale behind 
this move is to focus on the entire system, encompassing the ground control station, remote 
control operators, computer systems, and the aerial vehicle, not just the aerial vehicle itself. In 
late 2006/early 2007, the FAA mandated the use of the term UAS when applying for a certificate 
of authorization (CoA) to fly in national airspace. Based on that mandate, the DoD was the first 
agency to comply and has fully integrated the term into its programs. Corporate enterprises 
have since made the transition. With the ever expanding role of UAVs, it is only appropriate that 
NASA make the transition, too. 
In addition to these topics, NRS is keeping a close watch on the collision avoidance process 
with respect to impact probabilities and miss distances, changes in range architecture, and 
frequency management issues and concerns. NRS continues to work these issues to better 
understand the rationale behind each potential change and incorporate items in the NPR based 
on sound technical judgment while staying attuned to our dynamic environment. 
For more background and information on the NPR 8715.5 Revision, click here. 
3. Range Safety Launch Support Policy 
In previous annual reports, we have focused on how NASA Range Safety (NRS) implements 
NASA Range Safety policy and explained the various Memorandums of Agreement (MOA) and 
launch support policy letters that were developed with the Eastern and Western Ranges in order 
for NRS to adequately support pre-launch, launch, and post-launch activities. 
In 2008, NASA Range Safety continued work on developing a change to the Space Shuttle 
Program (SSP) Launch Commit Criteria (LCC) in an effort to implement the requirements of 
NPR 8715.5. Emphasis was placed on establishing a shared responsibility for range safety with 
the 45th Space Wing, establishing a real-time variance process and identifying appropriate 
countdown risk acceptors. Acceptable risk criteria consistent with the Range Safety Risk 
Management Plan (RSRMP) for the SSP, vehicle tracking, and command requirements are also 
being added. Furthermore, we worked with the 1st Range Operations Squadron to update 
mandatory criteria for the Range Safety Display System for Flight Operations Version 1 (FOV 
1). The resulting proposed LCC Change Notice (LCN) is being worked through the Space 
Shuttle Range Safety Panel. 
Additionally, NRS has been working an update to the KSC PLN 2804, John F. Kennedy Space 
Center Range Safety Landing Implementation Plan for Space Shuttle and the Landing 
Implementation Plan, and to KSC PLN 2805, John F. Kennedy Space Center Range Safety 
Risk Management Plan for Launch and Landing of the Space Shuttle, into a single document 
which includes the addition of Ares 1-X acceptable risk criteria. 
We are coordinating a review of our current MOA with the 45th Space Wing which is scheduled 
for its triennial review in February 2009. During this review process, we will jointly determine the 
applicability of each piece of the agreement and make updates and/or deletions where 
necessary. Our initial Range Safety MOA with the 30th Space Wing is still being coordinated 
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through Vandenberg Air Force Base leadership. We expect this MOA to be signed in early 
2009. 
We have also been very active in the development and implementation of tailored requirements 
for the Constellation Program for both Ares 1-X and Ares 1 as delineated in other included 
articles. Throughout 2009, we will continue to focus on the preparation of Launch Commit 
Criteria for Ares 1-X that allows shared responsibility of range safety requirements as described 
in AFSPCMAN 91-710 and NPR 8715.5. 
For more background and information on Range Safety Launch Support Policy, click here. 
4. Range Safety Group 
For more background and information on the Range Safety Group, click here. 
a. Range Commanders Council Range Safety Group Recap 
The Range Commanders Council (RCC) was founded in 1951 to provide a way for 000 test 
ranges to communicate and discuss problems common to all test ranges. Until this year, NASA 
was an Associate Member of the RCC with representatives on 6 of the 14 RCC working groups. 
In the 24 July, 2008 RCC meeting, NASA provided a detailed presentation of their research, 
development, and test capabilities and applied for full membership. The RCC unanimously 
approved the request, and NASA became an official voting member. 
The RCC Range Safety Group (RSG) continues to provide a forum in which ranges can 
standardize, develop, and improve on a variety of subjects and processes related to range 
safety. Range Safety representatives from NASA HO, KSC, DFRC, and WFF actively support 
the RSG and its subcommittees on a regular basis. The RSG chair for 2008 was from DFRC, 
and the new vice chair for 2009 is from WFF. There were two RSG meetings in 2008, 
summarized below. 
b. 102nd Range Safety Group Conference 
The 102nd RSG conference was hosted by the 30th Space Wing, Vandenberg Air Force Base, in 
Santa Maria, CA. The RSG main committee and Flight Termination Systems Committee 
(FTSC) met. The Directed Energy Range Safety Committee (DERSC) and the Risk Committee 
(RC) did not meet. 
In the main committee, special presentations were made by NAVAIR Pax River (UAV Incidents 
and Range Safety Criteria for UAVs); NASA DRFC (State Diagram for Standard FTS Tone 
Receivers), and Mantech SRS (Reusable Launch Vehicle Launch and Reentry and Non-
reusable Reentry Safety Requirements). The latter presented issues and concerns for the re-
write of AFSPCMAN 91-710 and 91-711. These presentations were followed by Range Reports 
from each range. 
Some of the topics discussed in the FTSC were the Enhanced Flight Termination System 
(EFTS) program update and status, various Autonomous Flight Termination System briefings, 
advanced high voltage ordnance initiation systems, a Subminiature Flight Safety System 
(SFSS) update, and commercial off-the-shelf software in ground transmitter systems. Special 
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presentations were also made by several vendors in attendance, including Ensign-Bickford, 
ATK Launch Systems, Honeywell, and ABSL Space Products. 
c. 103rd Range Safety Group Conference 
The 103rd RSG conference was hosted by Navy SCORE (Southern California Offshore Range) 
in October. It was held in San Diego at the Naval Air Station North Island Naval Base, 
Coronado. The RSG main committee and FTSC met; the RC and DERSC did not. 
In the RSG main committee, Navy SCORE gave an excellent briefing on their facilities and 
operations, which includes the nations largest underwater test range. Wallops Flight Facility 
also gave an in-depth presentation and discussion on the recent ALV-X1 failure at WFF, which 
included a successful activation of the Flight Termination System (see the WFF status report for 
more information on this event). These presentations were followed by the standard activity 
reports from each range. 
The main topic at the FTSC was EFTS. Several Ranges presented their implementation plans 
for EFTS and the timeline associated with this endeavor, including Eglin Air Force Base, 
Edwards Air Force Base/Dryden Flight Research Center, White Sands Missile Range, China 
Lake, and Point Mugu NAVAIR Pacific. The FTSC also discussed the various RCC documents 
that would need to be developed or updated to include EFTS. RCC 319, Flight Termination 
Systems Commonality Standard, would have to be revised and updated to include EFTS. 
Three documents would most likely have to be created to cover specific EFTS topics: an RCC, 
the Integrated Requirements Document that the EFTS program has developed; a second RCC 
document, the EFTS receiver specification that the EFTS program developed with L-3 
Cincinnati Electronics; and finally, the test standard for EFTS receivers, similar to RCC 313, 
Test Standards for Flight Termination Receivers/Decoders. 
The FTSC and EFTS program also assigned range identifiers to each test range. These range 
identifiers are part of the EFTS command message that is sent to the vehicle. Each range has 
a range 10 that is used during operations and each receiver has this range 10 loaded into it for 
verification. This prevents a range from inadvertently terminating a nominal vehicle operating 
on another range. 
The Risk Committee did not meet at either of these conferences because they were awaiting 
approval and funding for task proposals from the executive committee. Prior to the October 
RSG in San Diego, the Risk Committee received approval and funding for three tasks: 
1. An update to RCC 321-07 to include detailed guidelines on treatment of uncertainty in risk 
assessments and recommendations for evaluating catastrophic risk 
2. An update to RCC 321-07 to include conditional risk guidelines and criteria 
3. An update to RCC 321-07 to include specific actions for asset protection 
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5. Air Force and Federal Aviation Administration Common Standards Working 
Group (AF/FAA CSWG) 
Link from areas identified below for AFSPCMAN 91-710, 91-711, and Code of Federal 
Regulations Title 14, in folder (to date 91-712 not out) 
For more background and information on the Air Force and Federal Aviation Administration 
Common Standards Working Group, click here. 
a. Reusable Launch Vehicles (RLV) Requirements 
The AF/FAA CSWG RLV Sub-Group was formed in April 2006 to initiate the development of 
public safety requirements for the launch, reentry, and recovery of reusable launch vehicles. 
The group completed initial development of public safety requirements and sent the updates out 
to industry for comment. We spent approximately three months dispositioning comments and 
providing responses to industry. The estimated completion of manned RLV requirements (via 
incorporation into AFSPCMAN 91 -710) is CY 09. Additionally, the group worked RLV 
requirement inputs for AFSPCMAN 91-711 , which will be the focus once AFSPCMAN 91-710 
RL V requirements are complete. 
As new and emerging space launch technologies surface, the CSWG will continue to provide a 
forum through which the Air Force, FAA, NASA, and other government agencies can 
communicate. The goal of this group has been, and will always be, to maintain public safety in 
all phases of launch activities while developing and implementing common range safety 
standards. 
b. AFSPCMAN 91-710 Update 
Air Force Space Command Manual 91-710 (AFSPCMAN 91-710), Range Safety User 
Requirements specifies range user launch safety requirements. It was distributed to industry, 
NASA, and AFSPC organizations for review and comment in an effort to update the current July 
2004 version. Consolidated comments to the plan have been received, with the review and 
update process scheduled to being in early 2009. 
c. AFSPCMAN 91-712 
HQ AFSPC/SE will revise and combine the computer and software requirements for range 
users (currently in AFSPCMAN 91-710) and the computer and software requirements for range 
operators/acquirers into a single document, Air Force Space Command Manual 91-712 
(AFSPCMAN 91-712), Launch Safety Software and Computing System Requirements. AFSPC 
convened an AF/FAA CSWG Software Sub-Group to develop and coordinate these 
requirements. The draft computer and software requirements were sent to industry, range 
users (including NASA), and range operators/acquirers for their review and comment. HQ 
AFSPC/SEC continues the process of reviewing and dispositioning these comments. Both the 
AF and FAA want to ensure that the software requirements remain common between the two 
agencies. Currently there is no projected release date for this document. 
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6. Unmanned Aircraft Systems Working Group (UASWG) Policy Development 
Update 
For more background and information on the UASWG Policy Development Update, click here. 
a. An Evolution Trending Towards Revolution 
Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) is a technology evolving at an increasing pace. During the 
last two decades, there was a gradual evolution in the field from drones and Remotely Piloted 
Vehicles to Unmanned Air Vehicles (UAV). In the 1990s, the technology accelerated to include 
consideration of the entire flight system - the unmanned aircraft, the command and control 
links, the ground control system, the navigational inputs, and the controller. By 2000, such flight 
systems had evolved into network-centric and mature systems vital to fulfilling our national 
needs. These flight systems encompass a wide range of UASs, including hypersonic vehicles, 
rotary wing hover systems, lighter than air systems, and various hybrid vehicles. Included in 
this group are vehicles ranging is size from full scale aircraft down to vehicles the size of 
houseflies. All are considered UASs since they are controlled by computer programs or the pilot 
is not on board. 
As the technology advances, UASs will soon be operating at all altitudes of the atmosphere and 
beyond, and it is now difficult to distinguish any difference between an unmanned re-entering 
Reusable Launch Vehicle and an Unmanned Aircraft System. 
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In 2005, the NASA Range Safety office, the NASA Applied Technology Directorate, and the 
USAF 45th Space Wing Range Safety office formed an Unmanned Aircraft Systems Working 
Group (UASWG) to address the range support and range safety issues for such diverse 
systems operating near the launch head of the Eastern Range. 
b. Development of Range Safety Requirements 
Since 2005, a major technical thrust has been the development of range safety requirements 
specifically designed to the unique risks at the Eastern Range for unmanned aircraft system 
operations near the launch head. Such challenges include rocket plume effects upon 
unmanned aircraft system flight hardware, additional risks from unmanned aircraft system 
accidents impacting highly volatile rocket propellant facilities, and the application of risk 
management principles for the safety of personnel and public in relatively close proximity. 
During past efforts to address these challenges, the UASWG conducted an extensive document 
review (2005-2006) to identify subtopics to be addressed in a requirements document and a 
flight operations manual. Upon the completion of the document review, an outline was 
developed and sections were assigned to personnel to construct requirements. Adding 
challenge to the development of range safety requirements is the rapidly evolving operational 
concepts and current considerations for operating unmanned aircraft systems in the National 
Airspace. In 2007, the safety risk management process was significantly refined in order to 
address mature operational unmanned aircraft systems. 
During 2008, the Common Standards Working Group (CSWG) composed of members from Air 
Force Space Command, NASA, Federal Aviation Administration, and the commercial spacelift 
industry, worked diligently to rewrite Air Force Range Safety Manuals and AFSPCM 91-710 and 
711 to mitigate risks to public safety from the reentry of reusable launch vehicles. Efforts from 
the NASA-USAF UASWG were useful for these reusable launch vehicle operations. 
Terminology and paradigm differences between the aviation and rocketry communities were 
recognized and resolved by the creation of a "Flight Safety System Rosetta Stone." Paradigms 
for unmanned aircraft system flight safety systems are now being applied to reusable launch 
vehicle re-entry flight safety systems and risk-based safety requirements for manned and 
unmanned ballistic, aerodynamic, and buoyant flight operations are approaching consistency. 
c. Operational Priorities 
Prior to 2008, large unmanned aircraft system operations at Cape Canaveral AFS and Kennedy 
Space Center were not considered appropriate since they generated unwarranted risks to high 
priority national launch head assets and were an unnecessary hindrance to the primary mission 
of launch operations. This viewpoint changed with the DoD "Big Safari" Program in 2008, which 
involved several days of Predator B (aka Reaper) landing and takeoff operations from the Cape 
Canaveral Air Force Station Skid Strip. 
To accommodate the goals of Big Safari, Air Force Range Safety developed range safety 
practices for the program using concepts developed in the draft Unmanned Aircraft Systems 
Range Safety Requirements Document. Air Force Range Safety arranged flight patterns to 
avoid overflight of "risk multipliers" or launch head assets that would generate significant 
secondary risks if impacted by a flight accident. Air Force Range Safety established "Ditch 
Sites" at the end of every flight pattern leg and prior to the Skid Strip approach to safely 
terminate the flight if critical vehicle control performance parameters could not be confirmed. 
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Big Safari was conducted during and in close proximity to ongoing preparations for a Delta II 
launch without hindrance or unacceptable risk to either operation. 
Currently, support for other large, mature DoD and Department of Homeland Security 
unmanned aircraft systems is being considered, and the possibility of home-basing is being 
assessed. As requests are received for UAS operations of varying maturities and risks, further 
attention must be given to addressing safety critical technical challenges and configuring an 
approach for team responsiveness. 
d. Technical Challenges 
Two major technical challenges came to the forefront this year. First, determine how to manage 
relatively mature Unmanned Aircraft Systems within one or two orders of magnitude as reliable 
as traditional manned aviation systems. Second, determine how to recognize and certify critical 
Flight Safety Systems that were not standard from a traditional ballistic launch vehicle 
perspective but utilized in manned aircraft flight test. 
e. Managing Mature UASs 
The Big Safari operational support brought the first operationally mature unmanned aircraft 
system to CCAFS, initiating the technical challenges introduced in this section. To evaluate the 
actual maturity of the UAS, a maturity assessment was made, noting an Air Force-issued 
Airworthiness Certificate (AFMC Form 273) and taking into careful consideration accident rate 
data. This posed a challenge, however, as much of the accident rate data is recorded in terms 
of accidents per cumulative flight hours, whereas primary Launch Head safety concerns need to 
be addressed in terms of accident rates and cause during take-off, landing, and airfield flight 
pattern flight modes. Flight time risks during off-shore cruising flight modes confined within 
special use airspace are managed by procedural control mitigations. 
Risks during critical take-off, landing, and airfield flight pattern modes can be identified by first 
seeking data via a checklist derived from RCC Standard 323. Risks to the public and the launch 
head can be identified from this data. These risks were significantly mitigated by establishing 
flight rules establishing flight pattern and flight system health confirmations, coordination of radio 
and radar interferences, and minimum safe altitudes over critical areas. Emergency procedures 
were predefined for lost links, ditching, and crash landing. Compliance with Range Safety 
procedures was confirmed by the presence of a Range Safety Observer in the Ground Control 
Station (GCS) during critical phases of flight within 30 minutes of takeoff and landing. During all 
other phases, the Range Safety Observer was readily available. 
f. Reorganizing and Certifying UAS Flight Safety Systems 
Regarding the second technical challenge, an approach was needed to define broader 
requirements accommodating alternative, and as yet unforeseen, Flight Safety System options 
while ensuring public safety. 
Many Flight Safety System alternatives are in use throughout the aerospace industry including 
manned air flight, unmanned aircraft systems, precision guided munitions, manned spaceflight, 
small sounding rockets, re-entry payloads, etc. Flight Safety Systems provide a means of 
control during flight to prevent hazards from flight vehicles or payloads from reaching populated 
or protected area in the event of a flight vehicle failure. Flight Safety Systems include all 
airborne and ground hardware, software, and any human-in-the-Ioop controls used to protect 
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the public. Human-in-the-Ioop controls include associated human-systems interfaces and may 
involve ground-based Mission Flight Control Officers or Range Safety Officers, flight vehicle-
based pilots or Flight Safety Officers, or any combination of these elements. 
As a Range Safety tool, a Flight Safety System may be used to minimize public safety risk, 
liability, or emergency management functions. Risk management involves reducing risk to an 
acceptable level by methods such as destructively terminating flight, terminating thrust, or 
altering unacceptable vectors or momentum (occasional nudge or flight mode change). Liability 
management to record and document event outcomes may utilize a Flight Safety System's 
tracking capability. Likewise, emergency management functions need to know when, where, 
and how to execute emergency response protocols. 
A Flight Safety System may include any or all of the following subsystems depending on the 
nature of the risks to be mitigated: 
(1) Range Tracking Subsystem (RTS) - a method to track the flight vehicle. 
(2) A method to receive safety critical status data from the vehicle. 
(3) Command Subsystem - A method to either manually, autonomously, or by a combination 
of both to compare tracking and critical status data to the following established criteria: 
• Decide when and if corrective action is required to ensure the criteria is not 
violated. 
• Timely execute tl)e appropriate actions based on the data received or the absence 
of such data. 
• Individuals performing such manual functions may be referred to as Mission Flight 
Control Officers (MFCOs), Range Safety Officers (RSOs), or Pilots. 
(4) A method to affect change to ensure safety criteria is fulfilled, by either: 
• Flight Termination Subsystem (FTS) - all components that provide the ability to 
terminate a launch vehicle's flight in a controlled manner; the flight termination 
system consists of all command terminate subsystems, inadvertent separation 
destruct subsystems, or other subsystems and their components that are used to 
terminate flight. 
• Contingency Management Subsystem (CMS) - a method to execute commands to 
either place the vehicle in a safe or recovery mode or affect real-time corrective 
actions to resume safer flight. 
The reliability of a Flight Safety System is dependent upon the reliability of all components of the 
subsystems required in the solution to execute a safety control function. This includes 
components that are ground-based assets; aboard the risk-generating flight vehicle; aboard any 
other mobile or fixed relay or sensing platforms; inertial, GPS, or any other positional or state-
vector determining inputs; software; and the decision making process. Quantifying and 
confirming attainment of a Flight Safety System's reliability may be a critical and challenging 
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requirement. Therefore these reliability requirements need to be scalable dependent upon the 
specific risks and the specific risk mitigating solution. 
The aviation community continues to express concern over allowing unmanned aircraft system 
flight operations in shared airspace. Some unmanned aircraft systems are quite mature, but 
before they become as safe and reliable as piloted aircraft, technologies must continue to 
evolve. In pursuit of this goal, attention must be paid to the following : 
• A reliable means to "sense and avoid" other planes and obstructions. 
• New air-traffic control systems based on electronic rather than voice communications. 
• Ability to address and resolve in-flight unmanned aircraft system anomalies. 
g. Teaming for Responsiveness 
In 2005, the NASA Applied Technology directorate initiated the partnership with the Air Force to 
establish a joint UAS program for UAS operations at KSC, CCAFS, and PAFB with the common 
goal of meeting identified range mission goals. The need for the establishment of a UAS 
program was identified by NASA and the Air Force through work encompassed in a NASA-Air 
Force Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) for setting advanced range technology development 
goals, and proceeding with next generation technology development and demonstration. This 
was a NASA Range Safety funded activity. 
UAS range functions, as identified by the NASA programs and the Air Force, include UAS: 
• To be a relay site between launch vehicles and ground-based operations control centers, 
providing tracking, telemetry, and launch vehicle commanding. 
• To provide rapid responses; tracking and surveillance (i.e., SIGINT, ISR) utilizing thermal , 
optical, chemical, weather, radar systems. 
• To permit real-time, simultaneous monitoring of near-field and far-field zones. 
• To provide broadband communication (i.e., IRIS, iNET) extending to large areas. 
The NASA-AF UAS range goals will be met by: 
• Establishing a NASA-AF UAS Customer Process, UAS Requirements, UAS Concept-of-
Operations (CONOPS) for mission support. 
• Building a UAS customer base for development and on-site flight demonstrations of 
instrumentation and systems to meet NASA-AF range CONOPS goals. 
• Partnering with Services, Agencies, and Coalition elements to provide the best capabilities 
for future launches, with the benefit of simultaneous mission needs and cost sharing. 
• Seeking the best technical and operational concept solutions from Defense, industry and 
academic sources. 
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The NASA Applied Technology Direct'orate represented KSC in a new Integrated NASA UAS 
Working Group (INUWG), the first meeting being held at Ames Research Center in 2008. 
INUWG, a NASA-wide forum, was established to improve Agency-wide communication and 
coordination of UAS information, promote integration between NASA and other agencies, 
mitigate risk to mission, and optimize safety. INUWG members intend to standardize high-level 
NASA policies and procedures for UAS activity that will effect changes to each centers 
requirements process. The results of the INUWG will be reported annually to the NASA Inter-
Center Aviation Operations Panel (IAOP) Chair and NASA HQ Aviation Management Division 
(AMD). The NASA-AF UAS initiative will benefit from the INUWG membership through 
opportunities to share recent changes to FAA-NASA-DoD policies, procedures, and hazard 
identification summaries. 
The NASA-AF Unmanned Aircraft Systems Working Group continues to strive for operational 
robustness to protect personnel, property, other aircraft, and national assets, while enabling 
new flight systems to operate with appropriately managed risk. As UAS operations and range 
support become routine, the range safety requirements need to meld, possibly via a Common 
Standards Working Group subcommittee, to standardize USAF, FAA, and NASA Unmanned 
Aircraft System requirements. Range-unique concerns, avoiding risk to specific high value or 
hazardous national launch head assets, or conducting critical flight operations within hostile 
launch exhaust or accident environments could be addressed by such a subcommittee to seek 
requirements commonality and ability to link to range-specific supplemental requirements 
documents. Furthermore, such a subcommittee could enable the pursuit of developments for 
optimized collision avoidance systems and innovative flight safety systems. 
7. Flight Safety System Update 
For more background and information on the Flight Safety System Update, click here. 
a. Flight Safety System Challenges 
To protect of the public, the local workforce, and property, NASA Range Safety ensures that the 
Flight Safety System (FSS) associated with the launch vehicle is robust and reliable. NASA 
Range Safety is often faced with issues that could affect how the FSS functions and operates, 
and these issues must be vigorously investigated to ensure that the FSS will function properly 
when activated. Some of the major FSS challenges NASA Range Safety dealt with in 2008 are 
discussed below. 
b. Pyrotechnic Shock Testing Concerns 
One of the main test services providing pyrotechnic shock testing was found to be inadequate. 
Shock testing is performed on launch vehicle system components to ensure that components 
and systems will perform, nominally during flight. The test levels should envelope the maximum 
predicted environment (MPE) for that component plus some margin to account for nonnominal 
flight. There are a variety of different types of shock testing such as beam shock, drop shock, 
and pyrotechnic shock, as well as several different environmental testing services used to 
perform this testing. 
The pyrotechnic shock test service was found to be inadequate because a digital data 
acquisition system was being used without the use of an anti-aliasing filter. This caused the 
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reported shock test levels to be significantly higher than the actual shock levels, resulting in an 
under-test condition. 
The magnitude of the shock under-test varied with the specific test setup. For some 
components, the variation was as much as 20 dB or more at certain frequencies. Since several 
programs and vendors have their hardware tested at this location, it was determined that this 
poses a significant problem. Of particular interest to NASA Range Safety were the components 
located in the vehicle flight termination system. Numerous components were involved and were 
cleared for flight based on rationale such as design features, subsequent confidence testing, 
flight history, post-flight testing, and previous qualification and acceptance testing. 
Based on these test histories and associated analysis, NASA Range Safety had to make 
recommendations regarding these components and their ability to function nominally during 
flight. 
c. Constellation 
NASA Range Safety continues to work with the Constellation program to ensure that all range 
safety requirements are met. 
NASA Range Safety met with representatives from the Constellation Program, 45th Space Wing 
Safety Office and contractor personnel to continue the tailoring process of NPR 8715.5, Range 
Safety Program, and AFSPCMAN 91-710, Range Safety User Requirements. When finished, 
this document will be the official joint "Range Safety" document for the Constellation Program. 
d. Frequency Concerns 
Flight termination systems can be designed to use various frequencies for operation. The 
frequency used is dependant on the range. Each range has a set of frequencies or a frequency 
band in which they operate. The Eastern and Western Ranges have operated various 
programs and vehicles on 416.5 megahertz (MHz) for decades. However, the National 
Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) recently directed that 416.5 MHz no 
longer be used for flight termination purposes. In addition to their objection to overcrowding, the 
NTIA feels that wideband ultra high frequency systems, such as FTS, should be operating in the 
420-450 MHz spectrum. 
Range users have agreed to migrate to the 420-450 MHz band but have expressed concern 
that existing hardware has been purchased and implemented for 416.5 MHz use. Therefore, 
remaining launches already scheduled to use 416.5 MHz have been granted approval, while 
ultra high frequency systems for all subsequent flights will operate in the 420-450 MHz region. 
The one exception for the Eastern Range is the Space Shuttle Program. This program has a 
waiver to operate on 416.5 MHz through 2010. If Shuttle does not fly out by this date, another 
waiver will be requested. 
Another concern with transitioning to the 420-450 MHz region is that some high powered radars 
located at various installations operate in this frequency band. Some of these radars, such as 
the PAVE PAWS radar, have proven they can indeed interfere with the flight termination 
receivers located on the launch vehicle. 
The Eastern and Western Ranges have mitigation actions in place to coordinate range 
operations with the various installations using PAVE PAWS to ensure that no interference 
26 
occurs. One long term solution to this problem is migration to another frequency band where 
these radars do not exist. The Range Commanders Council Frequency Management Group 
has put in an official request for use of the 370-380 MHz band for FTS operations. As of this 
writing, no decision has been made. 
FIGURE 7: PAVE PAWS RADAR 
For more information click here for last year's article. 
e. Emerging Technology Development 
NASA Range Safety continues their involvement with emerging technology such as the 
Enhanced Flight Termination System (EFTS), the Autonomous Flight Safety System (AFSS), 
Reusable Launch Vehicles (RLVs), Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), and Space-Based 
Range Demonstration and Certification (SBRDC). Through various groups and technical 
interchanges including the Range Commanders Council Range Safety Group and the Common 
Standards Working Group, NASA Range Safety has been able to stay fully aware of the various 
programs and technologies that are being developed and continues to monitor these programs 
for future use and implementation 
C. RANGE SAFETY INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENTS 
NASA headquarters conducts independent process verification reviews at NASA Centers and 
Ranges to ensure, among other things, the mitigation of operational, health, and system 
hazards. Reviews also include compliance with laws, executive orders, publications and 
standards, local operating procedures, and special interest items that pertain to the center or 
range. 
In response to this requirement, the NASA Range Safety Manager participated in two 
independent assessments in 2008: Wallops Flight Facility Range Safety Office and range 
safety-related activities at Ames Research Center. 
Although each audit identified noncompliances and observations, it was noted that both Centers 
have integrated the NPR 8715.5 requirements into their Range Operations. NASA Range 
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Safety will track corrective actions based on audit findings. All findings were validated through 
the use of objective evidence and documented on assessment checklists. Findings were 
categorized as follows: 
• Observation - a condition not contrary to documented requirements but warrants 
improvement or clarification 
• Non-Compliance - failure to comply with documented requirements 
• Commendation - a process that is performed extraordinarily well or that would provide 
significant benefit to other centers or ranges 
For more background and information on Range Safety Independent Assessments, click here. 
1. Wallops Flight Facility Range Safety Office 
The first assessment was an Institutional/Facility/Operational (IFO) safety audit at Wallops Flight 
Facility, conducted from 15-18 July, 2008. 
a. Objectives of the Assessment 
The NASA Range Safety Office had conducted an independent assessment of the facility's 
Range Safety Office in 2005, so one objective of the assessment was to review the status and 
content of the 2005 corrective actions. 
b. Other objectives focused on evaluating the following primary areas: 
• Management of the Range Safety Training Program Documentation 
• Management of Range Safety Simulation Responsibilities 
• Range Safety Contingency Action Plans 
• Range Safety Flight Safety Officer Candidates 
• Range Safety Waiver Risk Assessment Process 
c. Results of the Assessment 
The assessment resulted in a commendation recognizing WFF Range Safety civil service and 
contractor support in their efforts in helping to develop the Agency Range Safety Operations 
training course. 
The completion of the RSO course was the final installment of an Agency-sponsored Range 
Safety Training curriculum made available to internal and external customers through the NASA 
Safety Training Center. 
This course is the first of its kind and succeeds where other attempts within the larger range 
safety community have failed. As a result, this course is being utilized by other governmental 
agencies (such as the FAA) and has been advertised to the 000 Range Commanders Council 
community. To date, three courses have been completed. Student feedback has shown that 
this course is popular and highly valued. A student word-of-mouth campaign has resulted in an 
increase in interest nationwide from the range safety community. The Agency Range Safety 
Manager has received some indications that this course is increasingly being looked upon as a 
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building block for a number of training programs. Demand for the course is high enough to 
require the Agency to maintain a waiting list. 
2. Ames Research Center Range Safety Related Activities 
The second assessment involved an Institutional/Facility/Operational (IFO) safety audit of Ames 
Research Center on 22-23 October, 2008. 
a. Objectives of the Assessment 
This was the first IFO safety audit that evaluated Ames Research Center plans regarding 
implementation of the policy and requirements of NPR 8715.5, Range Safety Program, which 
was our primary objective. 
b. Other objectives focused on evaluating the following primary areas: 
• Range Safety Program Documentation Management 
• Range Safety Training Plan for Designated Range Safety Officers (DRSOs) 
• Range Safety Risk Management Process for Operating UASs 
• Range Safety Flight Commit Criteria for UASs 
• Range Safety Contingency Action Plans for UAS operations 
• Designated Range Safety Officer (DRSO) Candidates 
• Range Safety Risk Management Plan (RSRMP) 
• Range Safety Frequency/Spectrum Management process 
• Range Safety Waiver Risk Assessment Process 
c. Results of the Assessment 
The assessment resulted in a commendation and a best practice write-up for the ARC Range 
Safety Officer for his outstanding leadership in establishing and implementing the range safety 
process for ARC UAS Operations. 
During a relatively short tenure, the ARC RSO has developed the structure of a sound range 
safety process at ARC to expand its UAS Program. 
Through these independent assessments, the NASA Range Safety Office maintains the 
baseline of the range safety organizations, determines the compliance or non-compliance of 
specific requirements, and monitors all open action items to completion. These independent 
assessments also continue to highlight exemplary performance and to provide an opportunity to 
enhance range safety programs throughout NASA. 
D. COMMON RISK ANALYSIS TOOL KIT DEVELOPMENT 
As required by NPR 8715.5; each range operation (launch or flight) shall undergo a range safety 
analysis to establish any design or operational constraints needed to control risk to persons and 
property. 
To date, each individual Center has met this requirement by developing analysis tools to 
estimate risk associated with different hazards. Risk models currently used by the Centers are 
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based on specific Center requirements and/or concerns and developed by Range Safety 
support contractor according to their areas of technical expertise. Some of the existing models 
have had peer reviews but have not been subjected to an extensive validation and verification 
(V&V) process. Most of the models also lack well-defined configuration management 
requirements and user training programs. 
Common Tool Kit Development is an attempt to better manage public safety risk models used 
by NASA by consolidating development efforts and identifying requirements for proper V&V and 
configuration management. The goal is to develop and make available to all Centers a suite of 
accepted models under formal configuration management. Training and certification will be 
required on performing hazard analysis using these models, the associated physics, and 
acceptable risk levels. This strategy will eliminate redundant risk model development at multiple 
Ranges and provide Ranges with expanded capability when necessary to evaluate new 
hazards. It will also somewhat standardize the analysis process and allow analysts to become 
well-versed in the standard format of hazard analyses utilized by all Centers. 
Greater emphasis is being placed on risk management and the use of rigorously validated and 
verified risk models as larger and more varied launch programs are introduced, such as ELVs, 
Reusable Launch Vehicles (RLVs), Reentry Vehicles, and in particular, the Constellation 
Program. For example, the development of an updated debris risk analysis tool for 
Constellation (Ares 1) continued during 2008. This task is intended to evaluate the current suite 
of Space Shuttle/ELV launch area and over flight debris risk models and their associated sub-
models to determine how they can be improved and integrated into a government-owned and -
operated risk analysis tool. This "tool bench" will have an open systems architecture that will 
provide economies in upgrading hardware, modifying existing models, interfacing new models 
when new or enhanced capabilities are required, and sharing physics and data modules 
between risk models. The tool bench will utilize formal processes for verification, validation, and 
acceptance (W&A) as well as configuration management and user training/certification. 
A draft requirements document outlining modeling capabilities, W&A, and configuration 
management has been completed. Evaluations of existing capabilities and proposals on both 
system architecture and new physics model development will begin in early 2009. Although 
initial development will focus on supporting Ares 1 debris risk analysis at the Eastern Range, 
plans are in place to expand the toolkit capability to include other hazards such as toxics and 
distant focusing overpressure, other launch vehicles such as EL Vs, RL Vs and UAVs, other 
phases of flight (descent), and other Centers and Ranges. 
For more background and information on Common Risk Analysis Tool Kit Development, click 
here. 
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III. SUPPORT TO PROGRAM OPERATIONS 
NASA and KSC Range Safety supported seven launches this year: one from the Western 
Range, five from the Eastern Range including four Shuttle launches, a Pegasus launch from 
Reagan Test Site, Kwajalein Atoll, and assisted WFF with the inaugural ATK ALV/HyBoL T 
launch. 
In order to ensure the requirements of NPR 8715.5 are met during pre-launch, launch, and post 
launch operations, NRS personnel work side by side with our Department of Defense 
counterparts in the Eastern or Western Range Operations Control Centers. In order to ensure 
safe flight and compliance with requirements identified in NASA safety directives, NRS 
personnel ensure any range safety-related activities with the potential to impact NASA launch 
criteria are relayed to the NASA Safety and Program officials. 
As we look forward to 2009, we anticipate supporting numerous ELV launches at both the 
Eastern and Western Ranges. Additionally, we expect to support five Shuttle missions as well 
as the Ares I-X Flight Test Vehicle in the spring/summer. 
Link to 2007 article 
EASTERN AND WESTERN RANGE 
Mission Vehicle Launch Site Launch Responsible 
Date Org 
ISS 1E STS-122 KSC 214/2008 000 
ISS 1J/A STS-123 KSC 3/11/2008 000 
NROL-28 Atlas 5 VAFB 3/13/2008 000 
GPS 2R19 (M6) Delta II CCAFS 3/15/2008 000 
ICOG1 Atlas 5 CCAFS 4/15/2008 000 
ISS1J STS-124 KSC 5/31/2008 NASA 
GLAST Delta II CCAFS 6/11/2008 000 
OSTM/Jason-2 Delta II VAFB 6/20/2008 000 
Geo Eye 1 Delta II VAFB 9/6/2008 000 
IBEX Pegasus Kwajalein Atoll 10/19/2008 000 
COSMO- Delta II VAFB 10/25/2008 000 
SkyMed 3 
ISS ULF2 STS 126 KSC 11/15/2008 NASA 
FIGURE 8: EASTERN AND WESTERN MISSIONS 2008 
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FIGURE 9: DRYDEN FLIGHT RESEARCH CENTER MISSIONS 2008 
Date Project Mission Location Mission 
Name Result 
01/1S/0S X-4SB LSV Flight # 7 EdwardsAFB Success 
(Blended Wing 
Body) 
01/31/0S X-4SB LSV Flight # 8 EdwardsAFB Success 
02l0S/0S X-4SB LSV Flight # 9 EdwardsAFB Success 
02l29/0S X-4SB LSV Flight # 10 EdwardsAFB Success 
03/07/0S X-4SB LSV Flight # 11 EdwardsAFB Success 
04/04/0S X-4SB LSV Flight # 12 EdwardsAFB Success 
04/17/0S X-4SB LSV Flight # 13 EdwardsAFB Success 
04/1S/0S Ikhana (NASA Flight # 55; Functional EdwardsAFB Success 
Predator B) Check Flight 
04/2S/0S Ikhana Flight # 56; Pilot EdwardsAFB Success 
Proficiency Flight 
05/06/0S Ikhana Flight # 57; Pilot EdwardsAFB Success 
Proficiency Flight 
05/0S/0S X-4SB LSV Flight # 14 EdwardsAFB Success 
05/0S/0S Ikhana Flight # 58; Functional Edwards AFB Success 
Check Flight 
05/14/0S Ikhana Flight # 59; Fiber EdwardsAFB Success 
Optic Wing Shape 
Sensing Research 
05/15/0S Ikhana Flight # 60; Fiber EdwardsAFB Success 
Optic Wing Shape 
Sensing Research 
OS/29/0S Ikhana Flight # 61; Fiber EdwardsAFB Success 
OptiC Wing Shape 
Sensing Research 
05/30/0S Ikhana Flight # 62; Fiber EdwardsAFB Success 
Optic Wing Shape 
Sensing Research 
06/1210S X-4SB LSV Flight # 15 Edwards AFB Success 
06/17/0S Ikhana Flight # 63; Fiber Edwards AFB Success 
Optic Wing Shape 
Sensing Research 
06/19/0S X-4SB LSV Flight # 16 EdwardsAFB Success 
06/2S/0S Ikhana Flight # 64; Functional Edwards AFB; Success 
Check Flight R-250S Complex 
07/01/0S Ikhana Flight # 65; California Edwards AFB; Success 
Emergency Fire R-250S Complex 
Mission 
07/03/0S X-4SB LSV Flight # 17 Edwards AFB Success 
07/0S/0S Ikhana Flight # 66; California Edwards AFB; Success 
Emergency Fire North and Central 
Mission California 
07/10/0S SmallUAS Edwards AFB Failure 
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Date Project Mission Location Mission 
Name Result 
07/19/08 Ikhana Flight # 67; California Edwards AFB; Success 
Emergency Fire North and Central 
Mission California 
07/21/08 X-48B LSV Flight # 18 EdwardsAFB Success 
07/21/08 X-48B LSV Flight # 19 EdwardsAFB Success 
07/25/08 X-48B LSV Flight # 20 Edwards AFB Success 
08/11/08 X-48B LSV Flight # 21 Edwards AFB Success 
08/11/08 X-48B LSV Flight # 22 Edwards AFB Success 
08/13/08 X-48B LSV Flight # 23 Edwards AFB Success 
08/18/08 Ikhana Flight # 68; Functional Edwards AFB Success 
Check Flight 
09/04/08 X-48B LSV Flight # 24 Edwards AFB Success 
09/11/08 X-48B LSV Flight # 25 Edwards AFB Success 
09/17108 Ikhana Flight # 69; Functional Edwards AFB; Success 
Check Flight R-2508 Complex 
09/18/08 X-48B LSV Flight # 26 Edwards AFB Early RTB" 
09/18/08 X-48B LSV Flight # 27 Edwards AFB Success 
09/19/08 Ikhana Flight # 70; California Edwards AFB; Success 
Emergency Fire Central California 
Mission 
09/24/08 X-48B LSV Flight # 28 Edwards AFB Success 
10/06/08 X-48B LSV Flight # 29 EdwardsAFB Success 
10/06/08 X-48B LSV Flight # 30 EdwardsAFB Success 
10/15/08 X-48B LSV Flight # 31 EdwardsAFB Success 
10/16/08 X-48B LSV Flight # 32 EdwardsAFB Success 
10/20/08 Ikhana Flight # 71; Functional EdwardsAFB Success 
Check Flight 
10/23/08 X-48B LSV Flight # 33 EdwardsAFB Success 
10/23/08 X-48B LSV Flight # 34 EdwardsAFB Success 
10/29/08 X-48B LSV Flight # 35 Edwards AFB Success 
10/30/08 X-48B LSV Flight # 36 EdwardsAFB Success 
11/01/08 Ikhana Flight # 72; Acoustics Edwards AFB Success 
11/21/08 X-48B LSV Flight # 37 EdwardsAFB Success 
11/21/08 X-48B LSV Flight # 38 EdwardsAFB Success 
11/25/08 X-48B LSV Flight # 39 Edwards AFB Success 
12102108 Ikhana Flight # 73; Functional Edwards AFB Success 
Check and 
Proficiency Flight 
12106/08 Ikhana Flight # 74; Acoustics Edwards AFB Success 
1 Single Pilot, Multi-Vehicle Flight. Total loss of one vehicle and associated payload. 
2 FTS Drogue Chute Bottle Pressure exceeded limit due to temperature inversion at altitude. 
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DATE VEHICLE ACRONYM LOCATION LAUNCH 
RESULT 
1/11/2008 36.243 Terrier-Black LIDOS (Long-Slit Imaging Dual White Sands Missile S 
Brant Order Spectrograph Range, NM 
1/18/2008 40.021 UE Black SCIFER-2 (Sounding of the Cusp Andoya Rocket S 
Brant XII Ion Fountain Energization Region- Range, Norway 
2) 
3/27/2008 36.226 Terrier-Black CIBER (Cosmic Infrared White Sands Missile S 
Brant Background Experiment) Range, NM 
4/14/2008 36.240 UE Black TIMED SEE Underflight Wallops Island S 
Brant IX Calibration Experiment (TIMED) 
- Thermospheric Ionosphere 
Mesosphere Energetics and 
Dynamics (SEE) - Solar EUV 
Experiment 
5/1/2008 36.223 UH Terrier- X-ray Quantum Calorime White Sands Missile S 
Black Brant Range, NM 
6/26/2008 39.008 DR Black NGSP (Next Generation Sensor Wallops Island S 
Brant XI Producibility) 
6/27/2008 30.074 NO Orion N/A Wallops Island S 
7/14/2008 41 .075 GT Terrier Sub-TEC II (Suborbital Wallops Island S 
Mk70 Improved Technology Experiment Carrier) 
Orion 
FIGURE 10: WALLOPS FLIGHT FACILITY MISSIONS 2008 
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IV. EMERGING TECHNOLOGY 
For more background and information on Emerging Technology, click here. 
A. RADIO FREQUENCY MONITORING AT KSC 
Radio Frequency (RF) Monitoring at Kennedy Space Center (KSC) is a vital function to 
guarantee a non-interference electromagnetic environment, especially during launch and 
landing operations, and is identified as one of the 2008 KSC High Priority Technology Needs. 
NASA and Soneticom, Inc, Melbourne, FL, with funding from the Innovative Partnerships 
Program (IPP), are installing and field testing a system at KSC to provide enhanced RF 
monitoring capabilities. The IPP established the Partnership Seed Fund to address barriers and 
initiate cost-shared, joint-development partnerships. The goals of this KSC/Soneticom 
partnership include: 
• Evaluating a commercial precision geolocation system that will continuously monitor RF 
activity in the KSC environment. 
• Identifying areas that might be detrimental to sensitive payloads and/or equipment. 
• Characterizing patterns of RF activity at KSC. 
• Evaluating the system's ability to identify and locate long-range/off-shore RF emissions. 
This project began in August 2008 with an IPP grant to install a three-sensor test system at KSC 
(Figure 11) with a team comprised of NASA KT-C and IT-D2-A, Soneticom, and the KSC 
Electromagnetics Effects Laboratory run by Boeing. The sensors are located at 520 feet on the 
roof of the Vehicle Assembly Building (VAB), at 45 feet on the roof of the Central 
Instrumentation Building (CIF), and at 18 feet on the Fire Rescue Training Building. These 
sensors can monitor frequencies from 30 MHz to 3 GHz in the shaded area shown in Figure 12. 
FIGURE 11: SENSOR LOCATIONS 
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This test system will support a variety of coordinated tests and experiments and will allow 
different teams at KSC an opportunity to become familiar with the function and capabilities of 
the precision geolocation system. If funding is available, the long-term goal of this project is to 
cover all of KSC and Cape Canaveral Air Force Station. 
FIGURE 12: THREE-SENSOR COVERAGE AREA 
Soneticom currently has two Phase II Small Business Initiative Research projects to provide 
specialized algorithms and advanced component designs to enhance the RF Monitoring at KSC. 
B. GPS METRIC'TRACKING UNIT (GMTU) 
As the access of space by commercial vehicles continues to be explored and the number of 
vehicles launching into space increases, the need to incorporate the latest tracking technology 
becomes a necessity. The tracking technology is the Global Positioning System (GPS), and 
although it is used in aerospace vehicles today, it has not become mainstream in space 
vehicles. Instead, technology developed over 50 years ago using ground-based radars is still 
being used today to track flight vehicles during the launch phase. In response to this need, 
NASA and the Air Force have agreed to use GPS on all flight vehicles starting in 2011 . 
Therefore, the development and testing of the GPS capability is critical to support the 
agreement and to support the transition of the GPS capability into future operational systems. 
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The Applied Technology Directorate of Kennedy Space Center has developed a lightweight, low 
cost GPS unit called the GPS Metric Tracking Unit (GMTU) (Figure 13) that will move forward 
the use of GPS systems on space vehicles in the future. This unit was developed under the 
Space-Based Range 
Demonstration and 
Certification (SBRDC) project 
(formerly known as the 
STARS project) with a 
primary goal of advancing 
range technologies in the 
area of Range Safety 
systems. 
The GMTU was the first step 
in a spiral development effort 
to develop a light weight, low 
cost. Space-Based 
Telemetry, Tracking, and 
Command Subsystem 
(STTACS) that provides 
expanded tracking 
capabilities for the space 
vehicle community and FIGURE 13: GPS METRIC TRACKING UNIT (GMTU) 
enhances Range Safety 
operations. The second step in the spiral development was the Low Cost TDRSS Transceiver 
(LCT2) developed by the Wallops Flight Facility (WFF). This LCT2 is a light weight, low cost 
FIGURE 14: GMTU FLIGHT TEST ON BOARD A 
SOUNDING ROCKET 
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transceiver that can transmit directly to 
the ground or to a geosynchronous 
relay satellite. 
Although the GMTU and LCT2 were 
independently implemented and 
tested, KSC and WFF engineers 
collaborated during the development 
efforts to allow the hardware to be 
integrated into a single enclosure 
leading to the final STT ACS 
subsystem. 
On 14 July, 2008, the GMTU was 
successfully flight tested onboard a 
sounding rocket on a suborbital flight 
from the WFF (Figure 14). The 
mission, named Sub-TEC II 
41.075/Smith, used a two-stage 
sounding rocket consisting of a 
Terrier/Orion booster combination (see 
Figure 2). The flight was a suborbital 
flight where the payload parachuted 
into the ocean and was recovered. 
This was the first flight test for the GMTU onboard a sounding rocket. 
A second flight test of the GMTU occurred on 7 November, 2008, this time successfully flying 
onboard an F-104 fighter jet from KSC (Figure 15 and 16). 
FIGURE 15: GMTU FLIGHT TEST ONBOARD A F-104 FIGHTER JET 
GMTU 
FIGURE 16: GMTU MOUNTED ON THE F-104'S EXPERIMENT PLATE 
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The GMTU consists of two boards: the KSC designed Command and Telemetry Processor 
(CTP) board (Figure 17), and the commercially available GPS receiver board. The CTP is the 
processor board for the GMTU that inputs commands, receives GPS data from the GPS 
receiver board, and outputs metric tracking data. The CTP was developed using state-of-the-art 
technologies that allowed a reduction in size from similar previous implementations. 
FIGURE 17: COMMAND AND TELEMETRY PROCESSOR (CTP) 
BOARD DEVELOPED AT KSC 
The CTP is a highly versatile, small , lightweight processor board designed for rugged 
applications and was developed to provide specific functions (namely, the command 
processing, telemetry processing, and GPS metric tracking of a flight vehicle). It can also be 
used as a general purpose processor board to perform numerous functions implemented in 
either hardware or software using the Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs) two PowerPC 
processors and/or its logic cells. The CTPs processors run the real-time VxWorks operating 
system. 
Functionally, the CTP was designed for range safety applications that would ultimately be part 
of a vehicle 's flight termination system. Subsequently, the major functions of the CTP are to 
perform the forward link command processing , GPS metric tracking, return link telemetry data 
processing , error detection and correction, data encryption/decryption, and flight termination 
action command processing. Additionally, the CTP can be used in many applications 
performing different functions and is not limited to range safety applications. The CTP is a 
programmable, configurable general purpose processor board that can survive and operate in a 
launch environment. 
The final step of the spiral development will be to integrate and test the GMTU and the LCT2 
into one unit. This integrated unit called the STT ACS can provide a space-based capability to 
the flight vehicle to track the vehicle, receive commands, and send telemetry data to the ground 
directly or through the space-based relay satell ite. The STTACS capability onboard a flight 
vehicle eliminates the need for down range ground stations. The STT ACS was designed to 
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meet Range Safety's link margin and latency requirements for vehicle flight termination 
commands and telemetry. 
The GMTU is controlled and configured through a serial or Ethernet interface. For the sounding 
rocket flight, the serial and Ethernet connections were available in the blockhouse using the 
vehicle's umbilical interface. Prior to launch, the Ethernet interface was used to verify that the 
GMTU was functioning properly. Once in flight, the GMTU sent its data to the vehicle's 
telemetry system which was downlinked to the ground. 
The resulting GMTU flight test results will continue to advance aerospace GPS system 
technologies and architectures. Such technologies help to reduce launch operations costs and 
provide the flexibility to launch from different areas and for different launch trajectories. 
Kev accomplishments: 
• Successful sounding rocket flight test on 14 July, 2008 
• Successfully demonstrated the GMTU in a launch environment 
• Successful F-1 04 flight test on 7 November, 2008 
• Successfully demonstrated the GMTU in an aircraft environment 
• Continued to increase in TRL and confidence of incorporating GPS technology in aerospace 
vehicles 
Future Plans: 
• Integrate and test the GMTU and the LCT2 into one unit called the STT ACS 
• Pursue efforts to transfer the system into operational use 
c. AUTONOMOUS FLIGHT SAFETY SYSTEM 
The Autonomous Flight Safety System (AFSS) is a joint Kennedy Space Center (KSC) and 
Wallops Flight Facility (WFF) project intended for use as an independent and autonomous flight 
termination subsystem for expendable launch vehicles. It uses tracking and attitude data from 
onboard Global Positioning System (GPS) and Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU) sensors and 
configurable rule-based algorithms to make flight termination decisions. 
The objectives of the AFSS are to increase capabilities by allowing launches from locations that 
do not have existing range safety infrastructure, to reduce costs by eliminating downrange 
tracking and communications assets, and to reduce the reaction time for flight termination 
decisions. 
Previous flight tests have been reported in the annual KSC Range Safety Report. This year the 
team has been preparing for the flight test of Test Article #3-the third prototype system of the 
overall AFSS program-on a Terrier Improved Orion sounding rocket at WFF in 2009. The 
flight test of Test Article #3 will be a demonstration of improvements from Test Article #2 that 
flew on the SpaceX Falcon at the Kwajalein/Reagan Test Site on 21 March, 2007. 
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1. Test Article #3 
Although Test Article #3 will have a similar hardware configuration as Test Article #2, many 
improvements and modifications have been made to advance toward the final system. Some of 
these improvements include: 
• A loosely coupled GPSIINS Kalman-filtered navigation solution has been added. 
• An improved ground support computer will be used to input the configuration and mission 
rules files, initialize the system, provide uplinked commands, and monitor the system's 
performance and software function indications. 
• The termination signal output will have a dummy ordnance load that will be monitored 
instead of only a software flag. 
• The team has taken steps to initiate an Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) of the 
software including the consolidation of key software design artifacts. 
• The AFSS team has been working with the WFF Range Safety office to tailor the Range 
Commanders Council Flight Termination Systems Commonality Standard, RCC 319. 
• There are additional input/output ports to the hardware chassis. 
• An external lanyard will provide first motion detection. 
• The low cost TDRSS Transceiver (LCT2) will provide a forward link to safe the system after 
the mission is finished and a return link to view the system's performance during the 
mission. 
• An automated test facility has been built at WFF to test GPS receivers, IMUs, and the AFSS. 
2. F-104 Flights 
The GPS/INS navigation hardware and software was flight tested on an F-104 at the KSC 
Shuttle Landing Facility (SLF) on 8 November, 2007 and 28 February, 2008. Data was also 
collected during a flight from Clearwater to KSC on 27 February, 2008. No flight rules were 
tested. The combined filtered position, velocity, and attitude data as functions of time were 
compared to the outputs from a GPS receiver and a separate Attitude Heading and Reference 
System. 
A Reimbursable Space Act Agreement, KCA-4143, between NASA KSC and Starfighters, Inc. 
provided the flight opportunity. NASA-KSC and Starfighters established the partnership to 
demonstrate the use of the SLF and the F-104 aircraft as a research platform to support NASA's 
plan for expanding the use of the SLF and to support NASA's project development. Starfighters 
had an additional partnership with Florida Institute of Technology (FIT) and its Florida 
Commercial Sub-orbital Research and Training Center. FIT was responsible for the design and 
fabrication of hardware required for payload installation and interface to the F-104. 
The flights provided the opportunity to find and correct several software problems before the 
upcoming sounding rocket flight of Test Article#3. 
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------- - ----- - - -------- ----- ----------------- -------------
FIGURE 18: STARFIGHTERS F104 
D. ENHANCED FLIGHT TERMINATION SYSTEM PROGRAM 
The objective of the Enhanced Flight Termination System Program (EFTS) is to develop the 
next generation flight termination system for the Department of Defense and NASA ranges. The 
program addresses robust command links for flight termination, including message formats, 
modulation methods, and encryption. 
1. Previous Status 
The Range Safety Group of the Range Commanders Council initiated a study task and 
ultimately selected the following: 
• Continuous phase frequency shift keying as the modulation scheme 
• A 64-bit triple data encryption standard for security 
• The layout of the 64-bit message for the new system 
The Air Force Flight Test Center then let a contract to build prototype enhanced flight 
termination receiver decoders and an encoder for the ground transmitter. The receiver decoder 
and encoder units successfully demonstrated that the enhanced flight termination system would 
function in flight and in an operational setting. 
The Central Test and Evaluation Investment Program (CTEIP) funded the development of the 
flight termination receiver decoders, encoders, monitors, and encryption units for different range 
applications, such as unmanned aerial vehicles, space launch vehicles, and missiles. In August 
2004, two contracts to develop the enhanced flight termination receiver decoder engineering 
development units were awarded to L-3 Cincinnati Electronics and Herley Industries. In August 
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2005, a contract to develop the ground systems (enhanced flight termination system encoder, 
monitor, and encryption unit) was awarded to L-3 Cincinnati Electronics. 
In early 2007, Qualification Testing was completed on three L-3 Cincinnati Electronics flight 
termination receivers. 
In October 2007, the entire system (ground equipment and receivers) was tested at Eglin Air 
Force Base (AFB) onboard an Advanced Mid-Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM). The system 
performed nominally and marked the first live test of the entire system. 
2. Current Accomplishments 
Milestones accomplished this year are described below. 
• The National Security Agency (NSA) has completed the certification of the EFTS units of L-3 
Cincinnati Electronics. The two types of EFTS units requiring NSA certification for usage 
are the flight termination receiver and the ground encryption module (the triple data 
encryption standard unit). Both the flight termination receiver and the ground encryption 
module have been certified by NSA. 
• With EFTS CTEIP funded development complete, ranges are now working toward 
implementing and deploying systems to support EFTS. 
• NAVAIR at Point Mugu has deployed an EFTS command transmitter system that supports 
the full Point Mugu range, but the system is not yet operational. This system is currently 
undergoing independent verification and validation (IV&V). 
• NASA Dryden Flight Research Center has deployed an EFTS command transmitter system 
that supports a single mission (single vehicle), but the system is not yet operational and is 
also currently undergoing IV& V. 
• White Sands Missile Range (WSMR) has begun upgrading to an EFTS command 
transmitter system. 
• Eglin AFB completed its request for information in preparation for a request for proposal for 
upgrading to an EFTS command transmitter system. 
3. Future Plans 
The Enhanced Flight Termination System Program will continue to work with various entities to 
achieve the goals of certifying this system. The program also desires additional testing attempts 
of the system in 2009 at various ranges. 
4. Enhanced Flight Termination System Architecture 
The Enhanced Flight Termination System architecture consists of the vehicle and ground 
systems shown in Figure 19 below. The Enhanced Flight Termination System was designed so 
that upon the completion and qualification of all units for both airborne and ground systems, 
implementation with existing architecture would minimally impact the ranges. 
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Vehicle 
Ground System 
FIGURE 19: ENHANCED FLIGHT TERMINATION SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE 
On the airborne side, the Enhanced Flight Termination System uses existing components and 
systems, where the only new addition would be the new Enhanced Flight Termination System 
command receiver/decoder. Legacy antennas, couplers, logic units, safety devices, and 
ordnance will be used along with the new command receiver/decoders and ground equipment. 
The ground systems architecture will change somewhat, but the impacts will not be severe. 
Ranges will have to purchase the new Enhanced Flight Termination System ground equipment 
(encoders, monitors, and triple data encryption units), and each range can develop the 
unencrypted 64-bit Enhanced Flight Termination System command frame (command controller) 
based on its own culture. The ground system will also implement existing technology and 
equipment including Range Safety Officer command panels, modulators/exciters, high power 
amplifiers, and command transmitters. 
5. Enhanced Flight Termination System Equipment 
Four of the major components of the Enhanced Flight Termination System (enhanced flight 
termination receiver, triple data encryption unit, encoder, and monitor) are described below. 
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a. Enhanced Flight Termination Receiver 
The receiver takes the encrypted messages sent from the 
command transmitter system (modulator, exciter, power 
amplifier) and decrypts them into useable commands. 
b. Triple Data Encryption Unit 
c. Encoder 
The triple data encryption unit is embedded within 
the encoders and encrypts the messages using the 
Triple Data Encryption Standard. A triple data 
encryption unit is embedded within each monitor for 
decryption of the Enhanced Flight Termination 
System message for analysis. 
The encoder takes the encrypted message from the triple data 
encryption unit and adds a certain amount of frame 
synchronization and parity bits for forward error correction before 
sending the final message to the Legacy exciters. 
d. Monitor 
The monitor is used as an analysis tool for range safety 
by providing an independent verification process for the 
transmitted Enhanced Flight Termination System signal. 
The command transmitter system sends the final 
encrypted Enhanced Flight Termination System message 
to the receiver and to the monitor. 
The Enhanced Flight Termination System Program has brought a new qualified, improved 
system to ranges and range users. Outstanding milestones still remain prior to bringing this 
new system into operational status. NASA Range Safety will continue to work with the 
Enhanced Flight Termination System Program and support the mission of providing a new 
advanced method of flight termination that will be low cost and low impact to ranges and range 
users, while providing a reliable system that will help ensure public safety during launch 
operations. 
E. JOINT ADVANCED RANGE SAFETY SYSTEM 
The Joint Advanced Range Safety System (JARRS) is a collaborative effort between Dryden 
Flight Research Center and the Air Force Flight Test Center at Edwards Air Force Base to 
develop a state-of-the-art mission planning, risk analysis, and risk management tool for range 
safety. The Range Safety organizations from all Major Range and Test Facility Bases (MRTFB) 
are being asked to support the development, testing, and operation of Uninhabited Aerial 
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Vehicles (UAVs) and Reusable Launch Vehicles (RLVs). It is the vision of JARRS to provide 
range safety support for these missions. 
JARRS consists of two primary elements: a Mission Analysis Software Tool and the Real-Time 
Operations Tool. The Mission Analysis Software Tool will quantify the range safety risk for a 
given flight path and its associated vehicle parameters using a computerized method. This 
method will streamline the range safety analysis by providing a consistent, high fidelity solution 
in less time than required by present methods of analysis. 
Additionally, the Real-Time Operations Tool will provide the Range Safety Officer with near real-
time assessment of the range safety risks during flight. This capability has many possible 
applications to the UAV or RL V operator, including assessment of UAV overflight of populated 
areas, allowing extended flight of an anomalous vehicle, recovery of an off-nominal vehicle at an 
alternate landing site, or selection of an alternate flight or entry path. 
Major accomplishments this year include a study comparing the probability of impact output 
from JARSS MP with data from a real-world case, improvements to population/asset 
management, added the ability to input a simple turn model, and the code was updated to 
MATLAB 2008a. 
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V. SPECIAL INTEREST ITEMS 
For more background and information on Special Interest Items, click here. 
A. NASA EXPENDABLE LAUNCH VEHICLE PAYLOAD SAFETY 
PROGRAM 
The Expendable Launch Vehicle (ELV) Payload Safety Program completed the NPR 8715.7, 
Expendable Launch Vehicle Payload Safety Program, on 30 May, 2008 and was approved by 
NASA Headquarters Office of Safety and Mission Assurance. This NPR contains NASA's 
policy, roles, and responsibilities, and safety review process requirements for safeguarding 
people and resources (including flight hardware and facilities) from hazards associated with 
payloads flying on uninhabited EL Vs. The hazards covered include those associated with 
payload to launch vehicle integration, multiple payloads, and payload-related Ground Support 
Equipment (GSE). NPR 8715.7 also provides for implementation of Safety and Mission 
Assurance (SMA) Technical Authority (per NPR 7120.5, NASA Space Flight Program and 
Project Management Requirements) with regard to safety concerns associated with ELV 
payload projects. 
In addition to placing NPR 8715.7 in the NODIS Library, an awareness letter was distributed 
from Bryan O'Connor, Chief, Safety and Mission Assurance. Introduction roll-out presentations 
were also provided at the appropriate centers, such as KSC, GSFC, and JPL. 
The current draft of the NASA ELV Payload Safety Program Agency Team Implementation Plan 
contains the roles and responsibilities of the Agency Team in connection with payloads that will 
fly on ELVs and their associated Payload Safety Working Groups (PSWGs). The purpose and 
scope of the Implementation Plan is to develop, maintain, and ensure consistent implementation 
of NASA's ELV payload safety requirements by assisting payload project Payload Safety 
Working Groups (PSWGs) when needed, providing Agency-wide technical perspective and 
insight on ELV payload safety-related issues, and supporting SMA Technical Authorities and the 
Office of Safety and Mission Assurance in matters involving EL V payload safety. It should be 
completed by February 2009. 
The ELV Payload Safety Program is tailoring the AFSPCMAN 91-710 in a joint effort with the Air 
Force (30th and 45th Space Wings) and applicable NASA Centers (JPL and GSFC). This 
AFSPCMAN 91-710(T) infuses applicable NASA, industry, and Air Force Range Safety 
requirements into a single standard for NASA Expendable Launch Vehicle Payload projects. 
This methodology will ensure a single baseline requirements document that the Payload Project 
Office will tailor for both Air Force and NASA acceptance and approval. This tailored document 
should be completed by the Spring of 2009. 
B. VAB HAZARD ANALYSIS FOR CONSTELLATION PROCESSING 
The Vehicle Assembly Building (VAB) is currently sited for processing a maximum of 16 Shuttle 
Solid Rocket Booster (SRB) segments. Constellation Program Planning calls for the processing 
of the Crew Launch Vehicle (CLV), Cargo Launch Vehicle (CaLV), and the Crew Exploration 
Vehicle (CEV) in the VAB, with the possibility in the out years of having all three vehicles (and 
perhaps multiple CaLVs) in the VAB at the same time. A study was initiated in 2007 to evaluate 
and document the Maximum Credible Event (MCE) that could be expected from Constellation 
vehicle processing in the VAB. The MCE results will be used to support KSC management 
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decisions on viability of existing facilities and personnel in regions around the VAS during the 
Constellation Program and the need for mitigation and/or new facilities. 
In mid-2008, KSC Safety and Mission Assurance Directorate Integration Office (KSC/SA-G) was 
given the project lead for the overall MCE approach and analyses. KSC range safety personnel 
were asked to support the team because of their experience and knowledge of available tools 
for assessing many of the hazards associated with an MCE in the VAS such as toxics, 
acoustics, and propulsive events. Hazard analyses are focused in six areas shown in the 
graphic below, with the top four analyses contributing to the Quantity-Distance (QD) Explosive 
Siting process and all six feeding into the overall VAS risk assessment process. 
Prelim 
Hazard 
Lst 
SRB 
Heat-Flux 
(NE) 
Hypergols 
(LX) 
Acoustics 
(NE) 
Toxies 
(SA) 
Structural 
(SA) 
Other 
Hazards 
(SA) 
QD 
Siting 
EAlRisk 
Assess. 
QD 
Mitigations 
Approvals, 
Or Waivers 
Integrated 
Hazard 
Assessment; 
Mitigations, 
FIGURE 20: HAZARD ANALYSES APPROACH 
Programl 
Center 
Risk 
Boards (eg) 
PRBI 
CSRPI 
Specifically, KSC range safety personnel and their contractors were asked to use traditional 
range safety modeling tools to validate the heat flux and hypergol initial results that were 
computed on more complex models such as computational fluid dynamics (CFD) and finite 
elements. Preliminary results from the hypergol blast validation have already influenced the 
mitigation plans for the VAS and the QD siting approach. 
Range safety tools will also be used to analyze the near-field and far-field toxic hazards using 
inputs from the heat flux CFD runs. The far-field toxic hazard will be assessed with computer 
models currently used by the Eastern and Western Ranges for launch area risk assessments 
during ELV launches. 
Finally, for the scenario of an SRM propulsive segment or stack potentially thrusting through the 
VAS roof, traditional range safety tools will be used to assess the risk to the KSC workforce and 
surrounding public. 
KSC range safety personnel will play an important role in many of the individual hazard 
analyses as well as the overall integrated risk assessment. The hazard analyses should be 
completed by mid 2011 to support the QD siting process and initial VAS operations for Ares I. 
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C. LAUNCH ANALYSIS PRODUCTION SYSTEM (LAPS) 
The 45th Space Wing (45 SW) operationally accepted replacement systems for the Cape 
Canaveral Air Force Station's 30-year old Data Processing System (DPS) on 27 October, 2008. 
The Launch Analysis Production System (LAPS) replaces the pre- and post-mission 
instrumentation analysis tools that resided on the DPS, and the Safety Hazard Analysis and 
Risk Processing (SHARP) replaces the flight safety analysis tools used during all phases of 
mission support. 
The 1970s, DPS (Figure 21) was increasingly difficult and expensive to maintain . It consisted of 
two Cyber 860 mainframes and terminals, located at the Central Computer Complex (CCC), 
with remote access terminals located at Patrick Air Force Base (PAFB) and the Morrell 
Operations Center (MOC). 
LAPS (Figure 22) was developed for the 45 SW by the Space 
and Missile Systems Center, Launch and Range Systems 
Wing (SMC/LRSW), and Spacelift Range System Contract 
(SLRSC). SHARP was developed by the 45 SW, Launch 
Safety Office, and their contractor, Millennium Engineering 
and Integration (MEl). 
The development teams, along with the 45 SW, Range 
Management Squadron (RMS) and Computer Sciences 
Raytheon (CSR) tested and accepted the long awaited 
systems. FIGURE 21: DPS 
Maintenance of the Cyber computers, which filled most of the CCC 
building at Cape Canaveral Air Force station (CCAFS), was difficult due 
to 1970-era equipment and parts. There was also increasing fear that 
major damage to the CCC, such as from a direct hurricane strike or 
flooding, could have impacted the antiquated equipment. 
During the 2004 Hurricane season, CCAFS was battered by hurricanes 
Charley (direct hit), Frances, and Jeanne. The aging Cyber hard drives 
failed from temperature instability caused by power outages and from 
the shutdown process. Approximately seven hard drives failed per 
hurricane impact, leaving the system without a full set of spares. 
Without DPS, there would be no instrumentation coverage plans or 
FIGURE 22: LAPS Range Safety background displays to support Eastern Range launches. 
System operators said LAPS is a "tremendous milestone for the ER" and SHARP is a "huge 
process improvement." 
The SHARP project is based upon the Joint Advanced Range Safety System (JARRS) tool 
bench, originally developed to support Mission Planning for UAVs and High Performance 
Vehicles. The tools required for the 45 SW Safety analysts to perform the analyses for ER-
specific vehicles were added to the tool bench, which has a modern user friendly interface. 
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FIGURE 23: USER INTERFACE 
Additionally, SHARP produces the outputs required to build backgrounds for the Real-Time 
Range Safety Displays and the SureTrak Surveillance Display System. Intermediate charts and 
displays are provided that assist analysts in determining if the products are being generated 
correctly. Some examples of these displays are provided to illustrate the diversity of these 
charts and displays. 
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The new systems are physically smaller, run faster, use standard commercial servers, are 
modern operating systems, and produce workstation computer products. SHARP is a PC-
based system and will execute on any size computer from a laptop to a cluster of processors. 
SHARP, coupled with LAPS, has increased ER support capabilities to effectively and efficiently 
launch rockets while ensuring safe access to space. 
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VI. STATUS REPORTS 
A. Kennedy Space Center (KSC) 
The Kennedy Space Center Range Safety Representative is tasked with implementing NASA 
policy and keeping the Agency Range Safety Manager informed of all activities related to range 
safety. Over the course of the past year, the KSC Range Safety Representative supported a 
multitude of range safety activities, ranging from prelaunch policy interpretation and guidance to 
providing on-console support during launch campaigns. 
For more background and information on the KSC Status Report, click here. 
1. Constellation Program 
The Kennedy Space Center Range Safety Representative participated in meetings and 
technical exchange sessions supporting the development of a set of tailored range safety 
requirements for the Ares 1-X Test Flight Mission. The tailored Range Safety Document, 
identified as CxP 70155-01, was approved by the Constellation Program Manager, the KSC 
Center Director, and the 45th Space Wing Commander in late October. The mission will be 
required to meet both the Air Force Space Command Manual (AFSPCMAN) 91-710, Range 
Safety User Requirements and NPR 8715.5, Range Safety Program Requirements. Working 
through the Launch Constellation Range Safety Panel (LCRSP), the 45th Space Wing Safety 
Office, Constellation Program Office, and NASA Range Safety successfully developed a single 
joint tailored document that includes all range safety requirements. This unique teaming 
process set the groundwork for future tailoring of Constellation Program range safety 
requirements. The effort also exemplified NASA's philosophy of accepting (or sharing) 
responsibility for all aspects of range safety. A draft set of tailored requirements for the Ares 1 
Launch Vehicle is also underway. 
The KSC Range Safety Representative led an effort to prepare a requirements document that 
will be used to develop a Constellation Program Range Safety Risk Analysis Tool Kit. In 2008, 
a team consisting of NASA Range Safety, JSC, the 45th Space Wing, and risk model 
development support contractors completed a requirements draft document that will pave the 
way for future risk model development. The document includes preferred modeling capabilities 
but also focuses on verification and validation (V&V) and configuration management 
requirements. Although the ascent debris hazard assessment capability will be developed first, 
other hazards such as decent debris, distant focusing overpressure (DFO), and toxics risk are 
also being considered. The draft requirements document was presented to a LCRSP splinter 
group in October and received positive feedback. 
The Range Safety Representative also provided continued support to the LCRSP and 
associated Constellation Program working groups. 
2. Space Shuttle Program 
The KSC Range Safety Representative was involved in the development of an update to the 
Launch Commit Criteria (LCC) for the Space Shuttle Program Document which will implement 
NPR 8715.5, Range Safety Program requirements. Working through the Shuttle Range Safety 
Panel, a proposed Launch Change Notice (LCN) incorporating KSC Center Director and Space 
Shuttle Program Manger responsibilities has been completed, as well as updated acceptable 
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risk criteria. The change is expected to be presented to the LCC Working Group in late 2008 or 
early 2009. 
Launch and entry risk estimates were evaluated for STS-122, STS-123, STS-124, and STS-
126, with mitigation efforts initiated through the KSC Emergency Operations Center when 
appropriate. 
The KSC Range Safety Representative also provided continued support to the Shuttle Range 
Safety Panel and supported STS-122, STS-123, STS-124, and STS-126 launches on console in 
the Morrell Operations Center (MOC). 
3. Launch Services Program 
The KSC Range Safety Representative supported a number of NASA expendable launch 
vehicle campaigns for the Launch Services Program (LSP), including GLAST, OSTM, and IBEX. 
This effort involved attending all the NASA and Air Force Safety readiness reviews and ensuring 
NPR requirements were being met during the respective prelaunch and launch countdowns. In 
2008, KSC Range Safety became an active participant in the LSP risk boards, presenting items 
that may increase the public safety risk to the public and workforce. 
4. Agency Activities 
The KSC Range Safety Representative served as a NASA point of contact to the Range Safety 
Group and supported committees charged with developing or rewriting nationwide standards on 
a number of important range safety issues. These topics included developing reusable launch 
vehicles, uninhabited aerial vehicles, and system requirements. The KSC Range Safety 
Representative was also active in the development of a proposed policy for the future use of 
autonomous flight safety systems within NASA. KSC is closely monitoring the status of the 
AFSPC-proposed decommissioning of Eastern and Western Range ground tracking and 
command assets through their Future Range Architecture Team. 
2008 was a challenging year, supporting a number of launch and entry campaigns, providing 
critical support to the Constellation Program, continuing to ensure Kennedy Space Center safely 
implements NASA Range Safety requirements, and tracking emerging technologies. The 
coming year promises to be equally busy, and the Kennedy Space Center Range Safety 
Representative will continue to provide critical support where necessary when called upon by 
NASA programs or to address issues as they arise. 
B. WALLOPS FLIGHT FACILITY 
Wallops Flight Facility (WFF) had a particularly active and successful year in 2008. The 
Wallops Safety Office (Code 803) supports all missions at Wallops and also provides support at 
various other locations around the world as needed. This support includes ground safety and 
flight safety analysis, documentation of operational rules, and active support of ground 
processing and flight operatiol')s. Listed below are various project/programs that the Wallops 
Safety Office supports. 
For more background and information on the WFF Status Report, click here. 
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1. Sounding Rocket Program 
The Sounding Rocket Program (SRP) conducted 9 missions, highlighted by a record breaking 
launch of a Black Brant XII from Andoya, Norway, which reached an apogee of 1,470 km. Four 
missions were launched from Wallops including two developmental test flights of a new vehicle 
based on the surplus M-26 Multi-Launch Rocket System motor and a very successful flight of 
Suborbital Technology Experiment Carrier (Sub-TEC II) payload, which was recovered 
approximately 70 miles offshore of Wallops. An additional four missions were successfully 
launched and recovered from the White Sands Missile Range. The Sounding Rockets program 
achieved an overall mission success rate of 100% for the missions launched in 2008. 
FIGURE 27: SUB-TEC II FIGURE 28: BLACK BRANT IX 
2. Balloon Program Office 
The Balloon Program Office at WFF conducted 14 missions during fiscal year 2008. Flight 
operations were conducted from Fort Sumner, New Mexico, and McMurdo, Antarctica, in 
support of Space and Earth Science payloads, as well as developmental test flights for new 
balloon design and balloon film qualification. Flight durations ranged from 4 hours to 30.5 days 
with the longest flight occurring over Antarctica. The Balloon Program Office continued the Ultra 
Long Duration Balloon (ULDB) vehicle development. Flight testing of larger scale designs of the 
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ULDB is planned for 2009. This balloon is being developed to provide extended duration flights 
(upwards of 60-100 days) at constant float altitudes. 
FIGURE 29: TYPICAL BALLOON LAUNCH 
3. Airborne Science Program 
The Airborne Science Program conducted a series of missions in 2008 using the Wallops P-3B 
research aircraft including Arctic Climate Change Flights (ARCTAS) over Canada, Alaska, and 
Greenland from April-July 2008. The ARCTAS mission was the largest of the year, involving 
flights with multiple agencies and aircraft. The P-3 also flew the Soil Moisture Mapping 
Validation Experiment (SMAP), which consisted of eight flights flown from Wallops with 100% 
success in September/October 2008. 
In February 2008, the Geostationary Imaging Fabry-Perot Spectrometer (GIFS) mission was 
flown from Wallops. It is a next-generation geostationary satellite concept for continuous 
hemispheric imaging of cloud properties, including cloud top pressure, optical depth, fraction, 
and surface reflectance. 
There were four successful P-3 flights in early February off the Atlantic Coast from Virginia to 
Georgia, with coordinated flights which included CALIPSO underpass flights along with the 
Langley Research Center (LaRC) B-200 Kingair aircraft. Wallops also continued its hurricane 
research collaboration with National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) using the 
AAl/Aerosonde Unmanned Aerial System (UAS). The Aerosonde UAS (Figure 30) was staged 
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from Barbados with a small group of NOAA personnel on site; however, the storms dissipated 
so the mission flights will be flown in the future. Many lessons learned were gathered for future 
hurricane missions with UAS. 
FIGURE 30: AEROSONDE 
4. Research Range 
In addition to internal NASA sounding rocket and UAV missions, the Research Range 
conducted numerous missions for NASA and non-NASA organizations. The Range launched 
the HyBoL T/SOAREX payloads for the LaRC on an ATK launch vehicle. Due to still unknown 
flight issues, the vehicle was safely terminated at 20 seconds into flight. The Range continues 
to support multiple test and operational UAS flights for NASA, 000, and commercial entities. 
The Range supported two missions for the U. S. Navy; the Advanced Modular Gun 
Demonstrator (AMGD) test firing , which included one ballistic round exceeding 70 nautical miles 
in range, and a UAS (Navy BQM-74, see Figure 32) low altitude flight. 
FIGURE 31: BaM LAUNCH 
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FIGURE 32: HYBOL T/SOAREX FLIGHT 
Wallops continued development of a number of key technologies intended to improve mission 
capabilities and lower costs. The third test of the Autonomous Flight Safety System (AFSS), 
incorporating full functional redundancy and integration of GPS and IMU sensors, is scheduled 
to be performed on a sounding rocket launched from Wallops. The WFF-developed Low-Cost 
Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System (TDRSS) Transceiver (LCT2) had several successful 
transmitter flights. Transceiver capabilities have been added and will be included on the AFSS 
flight. 
A new phased array antenna design that offers opportunity for significantly higher data rates on 
suborbital and orbital launch vehicles was successfully demonstrated on a sounding rocket in 
2008, as was a high data rate (-200MB) Ku Band telemetry system, in an effort sponsored by 
the Missile Defense Agency. 
Wallops continues to upgrade many of its safety critical systems. Funding has been received to 
upgrade our Flight Termination System (FTS) Command Transmitters to allow for the use of 
High Alpha and/or the Enhanced Flight Termination System (EFTS) secure commanding 
capability. Testing continues on the latest version of our real-time computer system that 
provides flight critical data from various radar and telemetry systems. Requirements 
documentation has begun on a new mission graphics system. Testing continues of a new 
aircraft and ship surveillance system. Each of these systems requires safety certification prior 
to use at WFF. 
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C. DRYDEN FLIGHT RESEARCH CENTER 
The Dryden Flight Research Center (DFRC) located at Edwards Air Force Base, California, is 
NASA's primary installation for flight research and flight testing. Projects at Dryden over the 
past 62 years have lead to major advancements in the design and capabilities of many civilian 
and military aircraft. 
The Center supports operations of the Space Shuttle and development of future access-to-
space vehicles, conducts airborne science missions and flight operations, and develops piloted 
and uninhabited aircraft test beds for research and science missions. 
Range safety operations at Dryden are managed by the Range Safety Office (RS Office). The 
Office was established by the Dryden Center Director under an alliance agreement with the Air 
Force Flight Test Center (AFFTC) to provide independent review and oversight of range safety 
issues. The Office supports the Center by providing trained Flight Terminations System (FTS) 
engineers, Range Safety risk analysts, and Range Safety Officers to provide mission and 
project support for Uninhabited Aerial System (UAS) Projects. The DFRC/AFFTC Range Safety 
Alliance allows both RS Offices to work together, each providing expertise on projects the other 
office may not be as familiar with. 
The DFRC/AFFTC Range Safety Alliance plans to install and test a fixed EFTS transmitter site 
which should be operational by the end of next calendar year. 
Dryden continues to support the testing of a wide range of UASs. The UASs that were flown 
with Dryden assistance include: 
For more background and information on the DFRC Status Report, click here. 
1. Small UASs 
Small UASs (sUAS) are in the model-type classification of flight vehicles. Dryden has 
established an area that offers sUAS Projects a unique opportunity to conduct flights within the 
restricted airspace. Dryden has also established a streamlined flight approval process for 
sUASs that makes the airworthiness and safety review quicker and easier than those performed 
for larger UASs. Dryden has supported over 300 hours of operations on 9 different platforms 
from 5 different manufacturers. 
2. Blended Wing Body Low Speed Vehicle 
The Blended Wing Body (BWB) Low Speed Vehicle (LSV) UAS, also known as X-48B LSV, is a 
dynamically scaled version of the original concept vehicle. The X-48B LSV Project is a 
partnership between NASA, Boeing, USAF Research Laboratory, and Cranfield Aerospace. 
The primary goals of the test and research project are to study the flight and handling 
characteristics of the BWB design, match the vehicle's performance with engineering predictions 
based on computer and wind tunnel studies, develop and evaluate digital flight control 
algorithms, and assess the integration of the propulsion system to the airframe. The BWB 
testing will address several key areas that future aeronautical designs will face, namely noise 
reduction, emissions reduction, and improvement in fuel economy. Industry studies suggest 
that because of its efficient configuration, the BWB would consume 20% less fuel than the 
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jetliners of today while cruising at high subsonic speeds on flights of up to 7,000 nautical miles. 
To date, the project has conducted 39 successful flights. 
3. NASA Global Hawk 
Dryden has acquired two former United States Air Force (USAF) Advanced Concept 
Technology Demonstration (ACTD) Global Hawk UASs. These preproduction Global Hawks 
were built by Northrop Grumman for the purpose of carrying reconnaissance payloads. The 
vehicles will primarily be used to supplement NASA's Science Mission Directorate by providing 
a high altitude, long endurance airborne science platform. The vehicle has an 11 ,000 nautical 
mile range and 30+ hour endurance at altitudes above 60,000 feet mean sea level (MSL). The 
first airborne science mission flight is scheduled for Spring 2009. 
4. Ikhana 
NASA's Ikhana UAV is a General Atomics Predator-B modified to support and conduct Earth 
Science missions for the Science Mission Directorate. The aircraft is designed to be 
disassembled and transported in a large shipping container aboard standard military transports. 
Last year, the vehicle successfully flew multiple missions over the western United States in 
support of the National Interagency Fire Center. The flights reached as far north as 
Washington, Idaho, and Montana. Recently, the vehicle has flown multiple successful missions 
over California wildfires, sending near real-time imagery to the firefighters . . The vehicle has also 
flown multiple flights in support of NASA research, specifically the Fiber Optic Wing Shape 
Sensing tests and Acoustics tests. 
Ikhana has been registered with the FAA and given the tail number N870NA. 
The Range Safety Office has supported flight planning and risk analysis tasks in support of FAA 
Certificate of Authorization (COA) applications as well as real-time operations support. The 
vehicle has flown 20 flights this year with durations lasting as long as 10 hours. 
5. Orion 
The Orion Project is an element of the Agency's Constellation Program. The Orion Project 
consists of the Crew Module (CM) and the Launch Abort System (LAS). Dryden is responsible 
for conducting a series of flight tests to demonstrate proper operation of the LAS and CM 
recovery systems in response to abort events initiated on the launch pad and during the initial 
ascent phase of flight. The abort flight tests will be conducted at U.S. Army's White Sands 
Missile Range (WSMR) in New Mexico. 
Dryden is currently in the process of integrating the Crew Module test article for the Pad Abort 1 
test flight. Dryden will also be responsible for integration of the second Crew Module test article 
for the Ascent Abort 1 test flight. Integration of the crew modules for the remaining flights will 
occur in the Orion Assembly Integration and Test Facility at NASA's Kennedy Space Center. 
The development testing that has occurred in Calendar Year 2008 include two successful full-
scale static test firings of the LAS jettison motor and one successful full-scale static test firing of 
the LAS abort motor. The jettison motor is a solid rocket motor designed to separate the LAS 
from the Crew Module. The abort motor is a solid rocket motor designed to separate the LAS 
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and Crew Module away from the Ares I launch vehicle in the event of a problem on the launch 
pad or anytime during first stage burn. 
The RS Office tailored NPR 8715.5, Range Safety Program, for Pad Abort #1 and provided 
input to RCC 319, Flight Termination Systems Commonality Standard tailoring for Ascent Abort 
#1. 
D. NASA HEADQUARTERS 
The Safety and Assurance Requirements Division (SARD) at HQ OSMA provides corporate 
leadership in the definition and implementation of NASA's Agency-wide Safety and Mission 
Assurance Policies, Procedures, Standards, Tools, Techniques, and Training. The HQ Range 
Safety Representative is located within SARD and has oversight responsibilities for the Agency 
Range Safety and EL V Payload Safety Programs. 
The HQ Range Safety Representative and other members of OSMA participated in several 
primary activities in 2008 in support of the Range Safety and ELV Payload Safety Programs: 
independent audits of the Agency and local Range Safety functions at Wallops Flight Facility 
and Ames Research Center; a continuing effort to update NPR 8715.5, Range Safety Program; 
and development and approval of NPR 8715.7, Expendable Launch Vehicle Payload Safety 
Program. The audits were conducted as part of the NASA HQ Safety and Mission Assurance 
Audits, Reviews, and Assessments Program defined by NPR 8705.6. Numerous proposed 
revisions to NPR 8715.5 were generated in 2008 by .the Agency Range Safety Team. A revised 
draft document has been developed and will undergo full Agency review in 2009. The HQ 
Range Safety Representative participated extensively in the development of NPR 8715.7 and 
was instrumental in its approval on 30 May, 2008. 
The HQ Range Safety Representative was directly involved in activities leading up to, during, 
and after the HyBoL T/SOAREX launch failure at Wallops Flight Facility: served on an 
Independent Review Team with focus on the Flight Termination System and other flight safety 
related systems; served on the Range Readiness Review Board; and served on a Special 
Action Team chartered to conduct a comprehensive review of NASA systems, processes, and 
performance associated with the launch. The Team verified that NASA followed proper 
procedures and that the safety systems functioned properly. 
Other activities included support to the Range Commanders Council Range Safety Group 
(RSG), Space Shuttle and Constellation Range Safety Panels, Common Standards Working 
Group (CSWG), and support to R&D projects such as Joint Advanced Range Safety System, 
Autonomous Flight Safety System, and Enhanced Flight Termination System (see separate 
articles on all these projects in this report). 
For more background and information on the NASA Headquarters Status Report, click here. 
E. JOHNSON SPACE CENTER 
For more background and information on the JSC Status Report, click here. 
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1. Launch Constellation Range Safety Panel 
The Launch Constellation Range Safety Panel (LCRSP) manages launch range safety matters 
for Constellation program vehicles, including specifying key interfaces with the Department of 
Defense (000) for launch range safety. 
This report summarizes the work conducted through the LCRSP and its two chartered working 
groups. 
a. Launch Constellation Range Safety Panel Trajectory Working Group 
The Trajectory Working Group (TWG) was the first sub-group chartered by the LCRSP. The 
primary responsibility of the group is to ensure that each Range Safety trajectory analysis 
requirement, as specified by the 45th Space Wing, is coordinated among the proper NASA 
centers. 
During 2008, the TWG activities were primarily focused on satisfying range safety requirements 
for a planned launch of the Ares I-X flight test vehicle in 2009. This effort involved Ares I-X 
simulation development and comparing the trajectory simulations being utilized at the various 
NASA centers involved in completing the Ares I-X analysis tasks Also included were activities 
supporting POST2 (LaRC), MAVERIC (MSFC), and ANTARES (JSC) as an ongoing process of 
an IV&Veffort. 
The following official products were completed and delivered for the Preliminary Flight Data 
Package (PFDP): 
(1) Ares I-X 3-Sigma Trajectory Envelopes 
These data were created by executing a 6-DOF simulation configured for Monte Carlo 
analysis using 64 system dispersions. The dispersions sets include aerodynamics, mass 
properties, sensor errors, propulsion, RSRM thrust vector control, and roll control system 
thrusters. The vehicle models consist of flight control system, aerodynamic, thrust, and 
mass properties as of June 2007. 
2000 Monte Carlo simulations for each of six wind profiles were executed to compute the six 
flight envelopes necessary to meet Air Force requirements. East and west wind runs are 
used to establish the launch area steep (LAS) flight envelope, the maximum instantaneous 
impact range (MaxllP) flight envelope, and the minimum instantaneous impact range 
(Min liP) flight envelope. The 50 & 230 degree azimuth wind runs are used to establish the 
launch area lateral (LAL) flight envelope. The north and south winds are used to establish 
the right and left instantaneous impact point (RIlP/LlIP) flight envelope. 
For e~ch flight envelope, determination a single trajectory was identified that closely 
followed the flight envelope to be used for vehicle debris footprint analysis. 
(2) Ares I-X Sonic Boom and Acoustic Analysis 
The analysis methods used in generating this data followed the "best practices" as 
described in NASA SP 8072 and utilized the atmospheric propagation effects as 
implemented in the Aircraft Noise Prediction Program (ANOPP). These methods were 
applied to the Ares I-X vehicle flying the nominal ADAC2 trajectory. 
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The Ares I-X primary propulsion system is comprised of Shuttle legacy hardware consisting 
of a four-segment solid rocket booster. The propulsion system generates a maximum of 3.1 
million pounds of thrust and subsequently 203 dB of acoustic energy. These numbers place 
the Ares rocket in a category below the Space Shuttle or Saturn V vehicles in terms of an 
acoustic environment. 
The sonic boom and acoustics information delivered was intended for use in both the 
Preliminary and Final Flight Data Packages unless further analysis by the Range Safety 
Officer was required or the vehicle or its trajectory undergo substantial modification. 
A significant amount of work was also conducted for delivery of the Final Flight Data Package 
(FFDP) required by the 45th Space Wing early next year: 
• Ares I-X Nominal and Malfunction Turn Trajectories including improved malfunction failure 
mode models. As in the preliminary data delivered in 2007, this dataset will include 
thousands of trajectories for various credible failure scenarios using updated vehicle 
models. 
• Ares I-X Three Sigma Flight Envelopes developed using the Monte Carlo technique and 
Space Shuttle trajectory component methodology and updated vehicle models. 
NASA centers providing support for these Ares I-X range safety products include Langley 
Research Center, Johnson Space Center, Marshall Space Flight Center, and Jet Propulsion 
Laboratory. Representatives from Kennedy Space Center and the 45th Space Wing were also 
regular participants in the working group and provided technical assistance on many occasions. 
b. Launch Constellation Range Safety Panel Probabilistic Risk Assessment Working 
Group 
The Probabilistic Risk Assessment Working Group was first chartered in early 2007 as the 
forum through which all launch vehicle range safety-related reliability analyses and products 
would be coordinated for the Constellation Program. This technical forum supports the Launch 
Constellation Range Safety Panel in all matters related to vehicle failure probability estimation 
for range safety risk assessments in compliance with the requirements of the Constellation 
Program, NASA's NPR 8715.5, Range Safety Program, and applicable Air Force Range Safety 
policy and requirements. The members of the working group include representatives from the 
Launch Vehicle Project Office (Ares, Ares I-X), Mission Operations, Safety and Mission 
Assurance, and the 45th Space Wing. 
The working group completed a number of tasks in 2008 in support of the Ares I-X fight test 
vehicle. In particular, the group coordinated all tasks pertaining to the final Ares I-X range 
safety probabilistic risk assessment to be provided to the United States Air Force as part of the 
Ares I-X final flight data package. The risk assessment was developed by Safety and Mission 
Assurance personnel at Johnson Space Center, Marshall Space Flight Center, and Langley 
Research Center. 
The Ares I-X range safety risk assessment is a new challenge in that it is a first of its kind 
vehicle. First flights of vehicles have historically been shown to be significantly riskier than 
mature vehicles due the unknowns associated with first flight. A new process is being 
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developed by the working group to estimate first flight failure probability based on probabilistic 
risk assessment (PRA) models which are developed normally to estimate mature system risk. 
The methodology being developed links the mature vehicle risk estimate from the PRA model to 
the empirically-derived first flight risk of 0.3 for experienced rocket developers and adjusts the 
PRA result based on the difference in complexity of the new vehicle to the "generic" vehicle risk 
of 0.3. The work and collaboration between NASA and the 45th Space Wing on this issue will 
continue to evolve. 
c. Other Topics Considered by the Launch Constellation Range Safety Panel 
Many other topics were again addressed this year, including Ares I Debris Catalog, Ares I-X 
Requirements Tailoring, Range Safety Tools and Modeling, Launch Enterprise Transformation 
Study, and Errant Launch Abort System 
(1) Ares 1 Debris Characterization 
Significant progress was made on the Ares I Debris Catalog using a debris risk assessment 
process. This process is made up of three phases: generating debris risk input data, developing 
the debris catalog for Range Safety and Orion aborts, and performing the Range Safety and 
Orion abort risk assessments. 
Several factors were identified that define the debris risk assessment inputs needed to conduct 
a breakup analysis, including malfunction turn failure modes, malfunction turn breakup 
estimations, aerodynamic breakup characterization, failure mode identification (explosive, non-
explosive), and upper stage and service module reentry rupture data. 
24 debris catalogs have been initially estimated when vehicle configuration and breakup modes 
are considered for each flight event. 
(2) Ares I-X Requirements Tailoring 
Tailoring of CxP 70155-01 , Ares I-X Range Safety Requirements document, developed through 
the Launch Constellation Range Safety Panel, has been completed and approved by the 
Steering Panel (45th Space Wing Commander, the Constellation Program Manager, and the 
KSC Center Director). 
This single tailored document combines the baseline requirements of AFSPCMAN 91-710 and 
NPR 8715.5 for Ares I-X. 
Volume 1, Range Safety Policies and Procedures, along with Volume 2, Flight Safety 
Requirements, and Volume 4, Airborne Flight Safety System Design, Test, and Documentation 
Requirements, were the focus of the tailoring effort. 
A request by the 45th Space Wing Commander to identify major departures from the current 
AFSPCMAN 91-710 requirements was addressed along with the public safety waiver approval 
process. 
Four Range Safety waivers to AFSPCMAN 91-710 requirements were proposed to eliminate 
major cost and schedule impacts where the public safety risk is considered very low. 
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(3) Range Safety Tools and Modeling 
A special Range Safety Tools and Modeling meeting was held in October to define simulation 
and processing models that are required to support Range Safety tasks, poll the agencies 
(NASA, 45th Space Wing, and industry) for possible model sources, and to create a roadmap for 
acquiring and developing the resources to support Ares 1-Y and subsequent projects. The goal 
of this exchange of information was to leverage off of work done and use available resources 
where requirements permit. 
Stake holders in this effort are the 45th Space Wing who ensure public safety, NASA Range 
Safety community who provide required data to the 45th Space Wing, and the Constellation 
Elements who conduct abort and crew risk studies. 
This face to face meeting also provided the opportunity for the range safety community to share 
information on the tools, processes, and analyses that could be used in the ex Debris Risk 
Assessment Process. This process will be used to create the Ares 1 debris catalogs and 
perform Range Safety and Orion abort risk assessments. 
(4) Launch Enterprise Transformation Study (LETS) 
Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) is proposing radical changes to the launch range 
infrastructure and operations to reduce operating costs. The Launch Enterprise Transformation 
Study (LETS) seeks to determine the cost and mission impacts if GPS Metric Tracking (MT) 
followed by an Autonomous Flight Safety System (AFSS) is required by all range users. 
The AFSS is an independent subsystem mounted onboard a vehicle that uses onboard tracking 
and telemetry to make Flight Termination System (FTS) decisions. These decisions are based 
on redundant independent sensors used to determine vehicle state (position, health, and status) 
and apply software-based flight rules. 
Radars will be reduced to a single modernized Radar Open-System Architecture (ROSA) radar 
at each launch head and manned ground-based flight termination systems (FTS) will be 
eliminated. These changes are expected to be phased in from 2010 through 2018. 
The Constellation Program is preparing a response to these changes through the Launch 
Constellation Range Safety Panel (LCRSP). The GPS MT capability is expected beginning with 
Ares 1-Y. There is no program impact expected, although a certification effort will need to be 
addressed. Constellation may have requirements beyond one launch head radar to track the 
first and upper stages, so the ability of single ROSA radar to interrogate two different beacons 
must be understood. 
NASA has taken the preliminary position that AFSS may be used only after a significant period 
of operational use on larger expendable launch vehicles and only in conjunction with man-in-
the-loop decision making on the ground. The human decision and the AFSS must agree for a 
destruct command to be sent. This operational concept meets NASA human error tolerance 
requirements by requiring two independent decisions for flight termination. 
(5) Errant Launch Abort System 
Early in the Abort Flight Test (AFT) program, the Flight Test Office determined that the size of 
the Orion abort motor was such that an evaluation would be required to see if a flight 
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termination system (FTS) would be required. Addition of an FTS is undesirable from a project 
standpoint due to additional development and certification activity with significant cost. 
The worst case scenario regarding safety from a range standpoint would be an inadvertent 
separation of the Launch Abort System (LAS) at or near abort motor ignition. It was decided 
that establishing the maximum range for an "errant LAS" would be a conservative boundary for 
establishing the launch pad location. The following Orion LAS scenarios were assessed: 
• Tail Feather scenario, where the LAS inadvertently separates at T=O. Analysis exhibited 
stable flight and resulted in a down range distance less than 4 nm. 
• Broken Tail Feather scenario, where a complete failure of all the LAS/CM connections 
results in fly-away LAS without the CM. Analysis exhibited stable flight, and all cases have 
a downrange distance less than 4 nm. 
• Broken Pencil scenario, assuming a complete failure of LAS abort motor/adapter cone field 
joint. This failure results in fly-away LAS without the CM or adapter cone. 
Analysis resulted in marginally stable to unstable flight. A couple of cases out of thousands 
exceeded 4 nm, indicating this failure scenario has a very low probability of occurring. 
After an independent assessment by Mantech, under contract to the KSC Safety Office, the 
WSMR Flight Safety Office accepted the Errant LAS analysis and concurred that FTS was not 
required. A 4 nm radius exclusion zone was established for the Pad Abort missions and LC-
32E was approved as the launch site. 
This report addresses many of the highlights from a very active year for the LCRSP. We are 
very fortunate to have such a high level of cooperation, focused productivity, and commitment 
demonstrated by this diverse community, including the 45th Space Wing and multiple NASA 
centers with their contractor teams. 
2. Space Shuttle Range Safety Panel 
During 2008, the Space Shuttle Range Safety Panel addressed several topics including the new 
launch conjunction process, low inclination public entry risk, solid rocket booster (SRB) beacon 
availability requirements, the Space Shuttle external tank (ET) entry assessment, SRB recovery 
ship positioning procedure changes, and launch and landing program requirements document 
updates. The following provides a summary of each of these topics. Also included is a list of 
Shuttle Range Safety Panel accomplishments for 2008. 
a. Space Shuttle Launch Conjunction Process 
In 2008, the Shuttle Range Safety Panel began an effort to define the Shuttle Program response 
to the United States Air Force (USAF) Special Instructions (SPINS) which direct that all 
launches out of the Eastern and Western ranges will be screened against the entire 
USSTRATCOM debris catalog. SPINS provides latitude for this screening allowing the use of 
either miss distance or statistical Probability of Collision (Pc) computations to determine times 
during the launching vehicle's launch window when unacceptable conjunctions are present. 
These times would be used to enact cutouts in the launch window. 
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The Range Safety Panel and the Joint Space Operations Center (JSpOC) are responsible for 
performing the conjunction analysis and have begun to define the process for Shuttle launches 
and identify issues that may result from the screening. NASA's primary concern was that the 
specified 25 km spherical miss distance would produce a large number of cutouts for objects 
that were not a threat to the Orbiter, since the uncertainty in the Shuttle insertion vector is much 
better understood than other launch vehicles. To minimize this concern, the Range Safety 
Panel and JSpOC recommended to USSTRA TeOM that the Pc and miss distance criteria that 
will be used for Shuttle launches be the same as the criteria that are currently contained in the 
Shuttle flight rules for pre-launch conjunction evaluation. 
Additionally, to facilitate this process, Shuttle data will be reformatted into the input format for 
the JSpOC program that will run the conjunction computations, an analysis will be completed to 
estimate the expected number of cutouts, and the logistics of handling cutouts that are 
produced in the firing room will be defined. The USAF is also planning two launches of 000 
payloads that will serve as test cases for the new pre-launch Collision Assessment (CIA) 
process. This process will not be implemented at the ranges until these test cases are 
complete. 
b. Space Shuttle Low Inclination Public Entry Risk: Flight Rule A2-207 and 
NSTS-60561 Updates as a Result of Hubble Space Telescope (HST) Servicing 
Mission 
Public entry risk analysts assessed the collective risk for the due east launch of STS-125 
Hubble Space Telescope servicing mission. The analysis revealed that approximately 23% of 
the entry opportunities to the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) landing site would be excluded 
because of the following wording in NPR 8715.5: 
"The assessed collective public risk for Space Shuttle entries shall not exceed the 
highest risk associated with the ascending entry trajectories into Kennedy Space Center 
(KSC) from the International Space Station orbit inclination of 51.6 degrees." 
The maximum collective risk for the HST mission to KSC is 2370x10-6 casualties per entry 
while the highest risk from a 51.6 degree orbit inclination, and therefore the maximum allowable 
casualties per entry, is 1800x1 0-6. Approximately 23% of HST trajectories exceeded the 
1800x10-6 limit. 
A collaborative effort between the Space Shuttle Program (SSP), NASA Headquarters (HQ), 
and the Office of Safety and Mission Assurance (OSMA) to revise and expand the collective 
public risk policy resulted in NASA Interim Directive (NID), NM8715-66. This revision used the 
same approach that was taken in developing the original policy for the 51.6 degree trajectories. 
The addition to the policy allows the SSP to use KSC as its primary landing site for the HST 
servicing mission, and, as with the ISS mission policy, it establishes a public safety risk 
threshold to be used when considering alternate landing sites. Concurrently, the NSTS-60561 
Range Safety Risk Management Plan for Entry of the Space Shuttle Orbiter document was 
updated to reflect the 2370x10-6 expected nominal end-of-mission for STS-125. An STS-125 
flight rule annex, FR 125_A2-99, was also submitted to outline changes to placards (for 51.6 
degree missions) listed in generic FR A2-207, Landing Site Selection. All of the proposed 
document modifications submitted were approved. Finally, the onsite risk to each continental 
US landing site workforce and its visitors was evaluated, and range safety personnel at each 
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site were informed of any changes. Impacts to the sites as a result of this analysis were 
minimal. 
c. Solid Rocket Booster Beacon Availability Requirements 
The Shuttle Range Safety Panel addressed the conflict of a Range Operations Supplement 
requirement for a single functioning solid rocket booster (SRB) beacon with the NASA-accepted 
Shuttle Launch Commit Criteria (LCC). The SRB beacons provide two advantages: 
1. Reliable and robust radar tracking off the pad and during possible catastrophic events. 
2. Allows for a delay of flight termination action after a vehicle breakup in first stage to 
protect the Orbiter when both beacons are operational (per the Range A4-258.C.3 flight 
rule). 
Radar skin track alone is not committed for the first 12 to 15 seconds of flight leaving only optics 
tracking. However, SRB beacons provide good radar tracking off the launch pad. The Panel 
agreed that the first 12 to 15 seconds of flight is likely the period of highest public risk and that a 
SRB beacon will help minimize public risk during this critical period. Additionally, requiring a 
SRB beacon would allow the Mission Flight Control Officer (MFCO) to delay destruct action 
after a first stage breakup as they could continue to track the individual SRBs. 
The Shuttle Program classifies the SRB beacons as a Crit 3 system with no redundancy on a 
single SRB. Therefore, requiring both beacons be functional could result in a launch scrub if a 
single beacon fails prior to launch. Since a launch scrub also provides risk and is more likely 
than a vehicle breakup scenario, the Range Safety Panel concluded that one beacon should be 
required and a two beacon requirement was not warranted. 
d. Space Shuttle External Tank (ET) Entry Assessment 
Ouring the ascent of STS-114 in 2005, a piece of foam was observed shedding from the ET. 
The Space Shuttle Program (SSP) later decided that tanks should be manufactured without 
Protuberance Air Load (PAL) ramps in order to reduce the risk of ET debris during ascent. Until 
tanks could be manufactured without PAL Ramps, all the existing tanks required the PAL 
Ramps to be removed. The associated ET design changes involved ET TPS thickness which 
affected ET rupture altitude, a driver in the ET debris footprint size. Mean ET rupture conditions 
for each of these tanks were assessed against the Shuttle Program requirement documented in 
Volume X (3.3.3.2.8.5) Mean ET rupture requirement of 249 kft. 
New Mean ET Entry trajectories (based on a 01-122 nm mission) were generated in 2006 which 
provided relief in the nominal mean rupture altitude and yielded acceptable mean rupture 
conditions. When all of the PJ\L-Ramp-removed tanks were flown, Shuttle missions utilized 
tanks manufactured without the PAL Ramps. The 01-122 ET Entry trajectories were re-
screened in 2008 to determine if they were applicable for future baseline tanks (manufactured 
without PAL ramps). The analysis indicated that the original 01-122 ET Entry trajectories were 
applicable for future tanks and also showed that new entry trajectories would provide thermal 
relief for the tanks if needed in the future. Based on these results, new 01-122 ET Entry 
trajectories were delivered for use on International Space Station missions (51.6 degree 
inclination, 01-122 nmi) that use an ET designed without PAL ramps. The analysis also 
confirmed that the generic ET entry trajectories already in Volume X (01-170 nm set) are still 
applicable for all missions. 
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e. SRB Recovery Ship Positioning Procedure Changes 
Shuttle Solid Rocket Booster (SRB) recovery ships for STS-118 were positioned further south 
cross-range than is optimal due to insufficient information needed to correctly interpret the Day 
of Launch (DOL) dual pane launch window. Prior to launch, SRB recovery ships are generally 
positioned at coordinates, specified by the Surveillance Control Officers (SCOs), for the launch 
window open (LWO) or in-plane launch time. The in-plane time is often the middle of a 10 
minute planar window. However, for STS-118 the dual pane resulted in a launch window of 
approximately 11 minutes and the recovery ships were incorrectly placed for the in-plane 
position of a 10 minute window. Additionally, changes from the in-plane time were not 
appropriately provided to the SCOs to calculate the final ship position. To correct these issues 
the Launch Countdown (LCD) procedure S0007 was updated so that the Flight Director will 
pass the in-plane time for the first pane to the NASA Test Director at L-1 H30M, and any launch 
deltas measured from the in-plane time will be passed from the Landing and Recovery Director 
(LRD) to the SCO for use beginning with STS-120. 
f. Launch and Landing Program Requirements Document Update for Jimsphere 
and AMPS 
The Launch and Landing Program Requirements Document (L&L PRD) which represents the 
formal agreement between the Range and the Space Shuttle Program, lists the jimsphere and 
AMPS (Automated Meteorological Profiling System) balloon based wind and atmosphere 
measurement systems as "MANDATORY" for launch. As documented, the Range is required to 
be NO-GO for launch in the event of a balloon system failure. However, these systems are only 
required for launch support by the MCC launch and landing assessment teams until about two 
hours prior to launch. A checkpoint was added to the Loads and DOLILU Officer (LDO) timeline 
to assess the requirement for the balloon systems at approximately launch minus two hours. If 
sufficient data has been received from the Range to assess the launch and landing 
environment, the LDO will notify the Ascent Flight Director (AFD) that the AMPS and Jimsphere 
balloon systems are no longer "MANDATORY" for launch. The AFD will relay the release of 
these systems to the NASA Test Director (NTD), who in turn will relay the change in status to 
the Range. Failure of the balloon systems after this point will not result in an automatic "NO-
GO" condition for the Range. 
g. Summary of other 2008 Shuttle Range Safety Panel Accomplishments: 
• Revised the NSTS Directive Number 42B: Space Shuttle Program (SSP) Range Safety 
Management Charter. 
• Proposed LCN update to LCC A4-258.C.3 to state NASA's requirement for one of two SRB 
beacons for launch. 
• Updated the NSTS 60561, Rev. A, Range Safety Risk Management Plan. 
• Created a NASA Interim Directive (NID) NM8715-66 for the NPR 8715.5 entry range safety 
policy update for STS-125. 
• Updated Flight Rule FR A2-207, Landing Site Selection, to reflect the entry range safety 
policy for STS-125. 
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• Proposed major updates to KSC's Risk Management Plan, KSC PLN 2805. 
• Updated the SOOO? checklist with a new step to release the L-1 hr weather data from 
"mandatory" to "required." 
69 
SUMMARY 
Range Safety was involved in a number of exciting and challenging activities and events in 2008 
involving the development, implementation, and support of range safety policies and 
procedures. Notable activities include the joint tailoring efforts between the Program, the 45th 
Space Wing, and the Launch Constellation Range Safety Panel supporting the Constellation 
Program; progress toward codifying updates to AFSPCMAN 91-710,91-711, and 91-712; and 
the continuing development and implementation of policies supporting the Uninhabited Aerial 
Vehicles program. Range Safety also initiated and nears completion of a revision of NPR 
8715.5, Range Safety Program, to accommodate developments in our evolving discipline. 
Range Safety representatives also took part in a number of panels and councils, including the 
Launch Constellation Range Safety Panel, the Space Shuttle Range Safety Panel, and the 
Range Commanders Council (RCC) and its subgroups. Until this year, NASA was an Associate 
Member of the RCC with representatives on 6 of the 14 RCC working groups. At the 24 July, 
2008 RCC meeting, NASA petitioned and was unanimously approved as an official voting 
member. 
Advancing our effort to provide training at various levels of range safety, 490 students 
participated in the 19 courses conducted in 2008. Additionally, NASA and KSC Range Safety 
supported seven launches this year consisting of one from the Western Range, five from the 
Eastern Range including four Shuttle launches, a Pegasus launch from Reagan Test Site, 
Kwajalein Atoll, and assisting WFF with the inaugural ATK ALV/HyBoLT launch. 
Range Safety also participated in the evaluation of several emerging technologies, including RF 
monitoring at KSC, GPS Metric Tracking Units, and the Autonomous Flight Safety System. The 
Enhanced Flight Termination System continues to advance, with ranges now working toward 
implementing and deploying the system. The Joint Advanced Range Safety System has also 
made progress toward achieving its goal of supporting Uninhabited Aerial Vehicle and Reusable 
Launch Vehicles at all ranges. 
We hope you found our web-based format for the Range Safety Annual Report to be usable and 
informative, and we hope that linking to the original articles has reduced the need for repetition 
in this report without sacrificing the quality of the information presented. As we move into 2009, 
we look forward to the opportunities and challenges of ensuring the safety of NASA activities 
and operations. Anyone having questions or wishing to have an article included in the 2009 
Range Safety Annual Report should contact Rich Lamoreaux, the NASA Range Safety Program 
Manager located at the Kennedy Space Center, or Michael Dook at NASA Headquarters. 
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